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The United States Navy and Marine Corps have identified capability gaps in the areas of 
collecting Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (ISR&T) data and 
employing fires during amphibious operations. The littoral combat ship (LCS) presents 
an opportunity to deploy specific mission capabilities in the amphibious theater. This 
paper identifies the operational, functional, and physical architecture of an LCS 
Amphibious Warfare Mission Package (LAMP) necessary to provide capabilities 
associated with ISR&T data collection and fires employment. Physical architecture 
configurations are evaluated using a discrete-event model. Cost estimates for each 
alternative are presented in order to identify the LAMP architecture that provides the 
most cost-effective solution for providing capabilities associated with ISR&T data 
collection and surface fires employment. This paper concludes by identifying potential 
LAMP assets that would provide cost-effective support of amphibious operations. Four 
feasible alternatives are ultimately identified as cost-effective solutions, with LCCEs 
ranging from $105.49M and $188.22M and providing varying levels of effectiveness in 
terms of average engagement time and percentage of threats successfully affected.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This paper identifies alternatives for providing fire support during amphibious operations 
with a littoral combat ship (LCS) mission package and evaluates the cost-effectiveness of 
those alternatives; alternative solutions are defined by the shipboard weapon system and 
air detachment assets that make up a given configuration. Four feasible alternatives are 
ultimately identified as cost-effective solutions, with life-cycle cost estimates (LCCEs) 
ranging from $105.49M and $188.22M and providing varying levels of effectiveness in 
terms of average engagement time and percentage of threats successfully affected. The 
four feasible alternatives consist of varying combinations of no shipboard weapon system 
or a 76 millimeter gun and an air detachment consisting of one or two MQ-8B aircraft 
equipped with the advanced precision kill weapon system (APKWS) or a single MH-60R 
aircraft equipped with the APKWS or Hellfire missiles.  
This paper considers the characteristics, feasibility, and cost-effectiveness of a 
LCS amphibious warfare MP (LAMP) in terms of capability gaps current experienced 
during amphibious operations. Specifically, this paper considers the ability of a LAMP to 
provide ISR&T data collection, aviation fires, and naval surface fires in support of 
amphibious operations. These activities were chosen for consideration due to their 
relationship to one another (e.g., fires employment requires the sufficient collection of 
targeting data prior to engagement). As a result of this choice, a supporting objective of 
this project was to validate the consideration of ISR&T and naval surface fires for 
inclusion in a single MP. 
This paper presents the operational, functional, and physical architecture of a 
LAMP to provide capabilities associated with ISR&T data collection and fires 
employment. A design reference mission (DRM) is presented in order to describe the 
environment in which a LAMP would be expected to operate. The DRM serves as a basis 
for identifying the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) against which potential solutions 
are evaluated in order to identify the most effective LAMP design. The MOEs identified 
are: 
 xvii 
1. Percent of targets identified in 4 hours 
2. Time between system receipt of fire mission and target impact 
3. Percent of targets successfully affected 
The developed operational architecture addresses the external activities that the 
LAMP must interact with as well as internal activities necessary for the LAMP to 
perform ISR&T data collection and fires employment. The operational architecture 
serves as the basis for a supporting functional architecture. The functional architecture 
defines the specific functions that the system must perform in order to accomplish the 
internal activities defined in the operational architecture, as well as the relationship of 
those functions to one another. 
With the operational and functional architectures established, the project identifies 
a physical architecture that would support the defined functional architecture. Elements 
are defined by considering related functionality and allocating that related functionality to 
a single element. Ultimately, the physical architecture of the LAMP consists of shooter, 
ISR&T, command and control, and support services subsystems. The shooter subsystem 
is further decomposed to shipboard and air weapon systems, while the ISR subsystem is 
further decomposed to air platforms and sensor subsystems. Currently fielded assets that 
provide the functionality associated with a given subsystem are identified in order to 
define the potential configurations of a LAMP. 
Potential configurations of a LAMP include a shipboard weapon system and an 
air detachment. This project considers the use of a 76 millimeter gun or a Global 
Positioning System Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) as the shipboard weapon 
system of a LAMP. This project considers air detachments consisting of up to three MQ-
8B Fire Scout unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with an Advanced Precision Kill 
Weapon System (APKWS), one MH-60R Seahawk helicopter equipped with Hellfire 
missiles or a APKWS, or one AH-1Z Viper helicopter equipped with Hellfire missiles or 
a APKWS. 
Physical configurations are evaluated using the output from simulation of a 
discrete-event model to determine the effectiveness of each LAMP configuration in terms 
 xviii 
of collecting ISR&T data and employing fire support; effectiveness is described in terms 
of the identified MOEs. The MOEs are used to calculate an overall measure of 
effectiveness (OMOE) for each LAMP configuration, using statistical analysis to identify 
the significant differences in effectiveness of 36 evaluated LAMP configurations. 
This paper also presents the estimated cost of each potential solution. The cost of 
the 36 evaluated LAMP configurations is estimated by considering the research and 
development, procurement, and operations and maintenance costs of the assets associated 
with a given configuration. These asset costs support life-cycle cost estimates of each 
LAMP configuration in support of identifying cost-effective LAMP configurations in 
terms of ISR&T data collection and fires employment. 
With OMOE and cost estimation data of potential physical configurations 
identified, the paper presents an analysis of alternatives (AoA) that identifies the most 
cost-effective LAMP configuration, of those evaluated, for providing ISR&T data 
collection and fires employment in support of amphibious operations. The AoA considers 
cost as an independent variable, identifies the non-dominated solutions, and discusses the 
relative benefits and drawbacks of each of the identified non-dominated solutions. 
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Through forward presence, the United States naval forces, including amphibious 
forces, safeguard the country’s national interests in peace while also providing deterrence 
against hostile acts of aggression. With 80 percent of the world’s population living within 
200 miles of the major ocean coastlines, the sea provides U.S. naval forces both a 
strategic and operational avenue for the projection of U.S. international power to 
influence the global system, protect U.S. citizens, assure U.S. Allies, and respond in 
times of crises (U.S. Marine Corps [USMC] 2012).  
Three forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) of the Marine 
Corps, embarked aboard three naval Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), compose the 
“Tip-of-the-Spear” of amphibious forces. While very capable in the low end of the 
spectrum of conflict, the capabilities of forward deployed naval amphibious force need to 
be re-evaluated and enhanced in order to ensure the dominance of the Navy force in the 
littorals across the entire spectrum of conflict (The Ellis Group 2012). Currently, 
amphibious forces have several capability gaps while operating in the littorals. With the 
recent initial deployments of individual littoral combat ship (LCS) platforms, this project 
explores how LCS can enhance the capabilities of naval amphibious forces in the 
littorals. 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defines the littorals as “an area extending 
from a transition point from open ocean (for example, the seabase or a launch point) to 
more constrictive and shallower waters, to the shore, and onward to those inland areas 
that can be attacked, supported and defended from the sea as defined by the Assured 
Maritime Access in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)” (DOD 2005, 1).  
“Given the range of modern systems, power projection in the littoral battle covers 
hundreds of miles in both directions and extends into the air and cyberspace. The 
maritime domain—which has always had a landward component—now extends much 
further, and encompasses a much more complex set of challenges” (USMC 2012, 33). 
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This project considers the ability of the LCS to effectively support amphibious 
operations. More specifically, this project identifies the requirements for a LCS mission 
package (MP) designed to perform joint fires and supporting intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR&T) missions. This chapter introduces the concepts of 
amphibious operations, the assets utilized in support of amphibious operations, joint fires 
as employed in the littorals, the LCS seaframe and mission package concept, and the 
systems engineering process used during this project. 
B. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 
As defined in Joint Publication (JP) 3–02, “An amphibious operation is a military 
operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force (AF) embarked in ships or craft 
with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force (LF) ashore to accomplish the 
assigned mission” (U.S. DOD 2009, ix). An AF is comprised of an LF and an amphibious 
task force (ATF), which is the naval element formed to conduct amphibious operations 
(U.S. DOD 2009). Amphibious operations apply maneuver principles to maritime power 
projection in joint and multinational operations (U.S. DOD 2009). Maritime-response 
capabilities provide a range of rapid intervention options that can be tailored to the 
demands of each contingency (The Ellis Group 2012). Operating from the seabase, AFs 
act as a natural deterrent to potential adversaries while providing the joint force 
commander with a mobile force. This force is flexible enough to facilitate the entry of 
follow-on forces, be the main or supporting effort, or achieve the objective in one swift 
operation. 
Amphibious operations can be scaled and tailored to support a specific mission 
and can be introduced across the range of military operations. Amphibious operations are 
categorized into five types: assaults, raids, demonstrations, withdrawals, and amphibious 
support to other operations (U.S. DOD 2009). Planning for any amphibious operation 
normally begins with a higher commander issuing an order to the commander of the AF 
to initiate the twenty-one steps of the deliberate amphibious planning process. 
Alternatively, the order is issued to the amphibious squadron commander of a forward 
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deployed AF to initiate the rapid response planning process, which is a unique capability 
of the standing ARG/MEUs.  
An amphibious assault is the traditional type of amphibious operation and seeks to 
establish an LF upon a hostile or potentially hostile shore (U.S. DOD 2009). An 
amphibious assault requires sufficient elements of the main body of the AF to be present 
in the operational area. In the amphibious assault, combat power is progressively phased 
ashore in order to accomplish the assigned mission (U.S. DOD 2009); the employment of 
combat power is preceded by advance operations and pre-assault operations.  
An amphibious raid is an operation smaller in scale than an assault. The raid 
involves a swift incursion into—or the temporary occupation of—an objective followed 
by a planned withdrawal. An amphibious raid requires extensive planning from the 
surprise arrival to the withdrawal (U.S. DOD 2009). 
An amphibious demonstration is intended to occupy the intelligence resources of 
an enemy by introducing false details on time, place, or strength of the main operation. 
The demonstration must occur over a long enough period to allow the enemy to react to 
the false information (U.S. DOD 2009). 
Amphibious withdrawals are operations conducted to extract friendly forces or 
civilians by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Withdrawal 
begins with establishment of defensive measures in the embarkation area and ends when 
all elements of the force have been extracted and embarked on designated shipping. 
Generally, operations focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and 
supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises (U.S. DOD 2009).  
Supporting operations are conducted by forces other than the AF and are enablers 
that support the execution of the amphibious operations. Support for amphibious 
operations can be broken down into intelligence, fire support, communications, logistics, 
protection, and seabasing (U.S. DOD 2009).  
For this paper, the primary AF of concern is the collective ARG/MEU. Typically, 
an amphibious operation is joint in nature and may require extensive air, land, maritime, 
space, and special operation forces participation. However, the deployment of such forces 
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requires time prior to the conduct of amphibious operations. The forward deployed ARG/
MEU provides a rapid-response capability for the joint force commander or the joint 
force maritime component commander to coordinate a small-scale amphibious operation 
(senior Marine advisor to naval sea systems command, pers. comm.). 
The ARG/MEU is the most frequently employed ATF formed to conduct 
amphibious operations. The MEU, serving as the LF, is embarked aboard the ships of the 
ARG, together comprising a self-contained, forward deployed AF. 
The ATF of the ARG consists of, at a minimum, three Navy ships specifically 
designed to transport, land and support the LF (U.S. DOD 2009): 
1. One amphibious assault ship (either the general purpose amphibious  
assault ship (LHA) or the multipurpose amphibious assault ship (LHD)) 
2. One amphibious transport dock ship (LPD) 
3. One amphibious dock landing ship (LSD) 
In addition to the ships, the principal naval elements of the ARG are a Naval 
Beach Group Element that includes Beachmasters, who control the movement of 
personnel and equipment across the beach; Assault Craft Unit elements that bring the 
landing craft; both air cushion landing craft (LCAC) and utility landing craft (LCU) 
platforms that move equipment and personnel from the ship to the shore; the tactical air 
control squadron element that provides aviation control; a Fleet Surgical Team that 
provides enhanced medical support; and a Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron element that 
provides airborne search and rescue, vertical replenishment, air and sea defense and 
limited assault support (USMC n.d.). 
Normally comprised of over 2,400 personnel, a MEU is the smallest standalone 
Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is constructed around a reinforced infantry 
battalion, a composite squadron, and a task-organized combat service support element 
(U.S. DOD 2014a). The MEU provides a quick reaction capability for crisis response and 
is capable of limited combat operations (U.S. DOD 2014a).  Figure 1 depicts the ships of 




Figure 1 ARG/MEU Naval Warships and Support Elements (from 
USMC n.d.) 
As described in the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Force 21 (EF-21), the MEUs 
and their associated ARGs will continue to provide forward presence over the next 10 
years in key regions through a combination of forward basing and rotational deployments 
(USMC 2014(b)). The MEU’s strength is its ability to respond to crises as an integrated 
MAGTF. EF-21 emphasizes the importance of exploring ways to evolve the MEU to 
accommodate changes in basing, capability, and capacity, as well as exploring the use of 
prepositioned equipment, land basing, complementary force packages, and alternative 
platforms (USMC 2014b). 
Normally, two to three ARGs are forward deployed: one in the Mediterranean 
Sea/Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area, and one or two in the Western Pacific Ocean area. 
Other amphibious ships are either working up to deploy, in transit, or in overhaul (U.S. 
Navy 2005). 
Though the MEU’s primary steady-state activities are deterrence and forward 
presence, it also conducts a range of other activities that enhance interoperability with 
capable partner nation forces (USMC n.d.). When required, MEUs will join other forward 
forces to provide the foundation of a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), a LF with 
5000+ Marines, to perform contingency operations (USMC 2014b). 
Figure 2 shows the projected operating environment (POE) of AFs, as envisioned 
by EF- 21. It includes multiple ARG/MEUs operating together with a wide variety of 
other naval and air assets, projecting power in a multi-phased, multi-pronged operation. 
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Within this context, an ARG/MEU may be responsible for a single objective that supports 
the overall operation. Depending on the specific objective and the difficulty of other 
objectives, the ARG/MEU may receive fire support, intelligence, target designation, or 
other assistance from other assets, such as land-based aircraft, a carrier strike group 
(CSG), or ground units in the area of interest, and must be able to effectively 
communicate and coordinate with those assets. 
 
Figure 2 Disaggregated Amphibious Operations in Challenging 
Littoral Environment (from USMC 2014a) 
C. CAPABILITY GAPS 
This paper considered the capability gaps associated with amphibious operations. 
For this consideration, the team evaluated several existing documents identifying 
capability gaps for amphibious operations, including the USMC Program Objective 
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Memorandum (POM) 16 Marine Corps gaps list (MCGL), Joint Fires ICD, Unmanned 
Systems ICD, and Ship to Shore Connector ICD. 
The MCGL was developed in support of the POM-16 Marine Corps Enterprise 
Integration Plan. As stated in the 2013 USMC Marine Corps Capability List (MCCL), the 
MAGTF Integration Division provides capability datasets to support the capabilities 
based assessment (CBA) process supporting the Joint Capabilities Integration 
Development System (JCIDS) used to define the MCGL. The CBA reviews current 
operational readiness based on joint doctrine and ICDs and identifies those USMC 
capabilities requiring the greatest financial resources. The Marine Corps CBA branch 
produces and maintains the MCGL for annual review and update.  
As part of the POM-16 MCGL process, each capability gap was assigned a risk 
category based on the gap’s potential operational impact. The potential impact of the 
realized capability gap and the MCGL rank associated with the given capability gap are 
taken into account to calculate a normalized gap score which is also captured in the 
MCGL table. The normalized gap score is used to rank all of the gaps listed in the 
MCGL. An excerpt of the MCGL is shown in Table 1. 
The POM-16 MCGL annual review process validates existing capability gaps, 
identifies new capability caps, and consolidates areas of redundancy. Each gap has an 
associated title and description to detail the specific capability gap, as well as an 
associated MCCL capability area. The top-ranking MCCL capability area in the POM-16 
MCGL is 3.2 Engage Targets.  Table 1 provides an excerpt of the MCGL to provide an 







 POM-16 MCGL Excerpt (from USMC 2014a) Table 1
 
 
After reviewing the POM-16 MCGL and listed ICDs, the identified capability 
gaps (i.e., ship-to-shore connectors; ISR&T in support of employing fires; employment of 
fires; command and control of fires; and logistics support) were evaluated, and the joint 
fires and supporting ISR&T capabilities were chosen for further assessment by this 
project. The gaps not considered by this project provide an area for future work.  
The remainder of this section provides an overview of the capability gaps 
associated with fire support and ISR&T data collection operations as they relate to 
amphibious operations. A complete list of the fire support and ISR&T capability gaps 
considered by this project is provided as Appendix A. 
1. Fire Support 
Fire support is defined as “fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, 
and special operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in 
pursuit of tactical and operational objectives” (U.S. DOD 2014a, 94).  “Fires” is defined 
as “the use of weapon systems to create specific lethal and nonlethal effects on a target” 
(U.S. DOD 2014a, 94). 
Joint fires capabilities [are to] be fully synchronized with maneuver in 
simultaneous and distributed engagements while also protecting on-going 
insertion, support and sustainment forces, during ideal and restricted 
weather, terrain and other environmental conditions. Integrating guidance 
from the major contingency operation (MCO) Joint Operation 
Commander, the Army Joint Fires concept of operations (CONOPS), the 
Marine Corps Ship to Objective Maneuver and Distributed Operations 
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CONOPS, and Air Force Global Persistent Attack CONOPS, the Joint 
Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals ICD is 
holistically applicable as a joint interdependent capability to deliver 
complementary and reinforcing effects. The Commander requires 
effective, agile and responsive fires capabilities, therefore the underlying 
concept of operations is that joint fires are necessary wherever future 
combat operations are conducted, from traditional warfare to irregular 
warfare scenarios. (U.S. DOD 2005, 6)  
 
As described in the Joint Fires ICD, the joint fires kill chain includes nine critical 
tasks: 
• Detect and locate targets 
• Dynamically re-task ISR&T assets 
• Select and analyze fused, all-source, multi-intelligence information 
• Exercise command and control 
• Establish precise geo-location of a target at a specific point in time 
• Track and identify targets and establish track priorities 
• Assign target-weapon pairing and provide target locations, target 
descriptions, and specify methods of fire 
• Conduct Joint Fire Support to achieve desired effects 
• Conduct an effects-based assessment of executed fires 
“Existing fielded and program of record (POR) systems have shortcomings that 
limit the ability of the Commander to employ joint fires against the target sets expected 
during the MCO and global war on terrorism (GWOT) campaign scenario” (U.S. DOD 
2005, 7). The capabilities not adequately provided by existing fielded and POR systems 
are discussed below and referenced from the Joint Fires and Unmanned Systems ICDs. 
The Joint Fires ICD identified the following capability gaps associated with fire 
support: 
• The ability to engage known and/or identified targets when friendly forces 
are in close contact or when collateral damage is a concern. 
• The ability to provide fires to achieve volume effects. 
Prior to the promulgation of JCIDS, the naval surface fire support (NSFS) mission 
need statement documented the capability requirement for NSFS. This document, last 
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revised in 1992, provided requirements for ship-mounted weapons systems that would 
support the LF during an amphibious operation with defended territory. Improvements in 
joint warfighting capabilities and shared command and control structures created an 
impetus for redefining the employment of supporting fires (U.S. DOD 2005). 
The ICD for Joint Fires, published in 2005, goes a long way toward building the 
foundation for the modern-day concept of “a single naval battle,” which aims to integrate 
carrier-strike aviation, submarines, expeditionary fixed-wing capabilities, missile 
defense, rotary-wing fires, and surface fire support and ground fires capability. The 
capability to conduct Joint Fires is a critical enabler for the joint force commander 
(USMC 2012). 
During the development of the ICD for Joint Fires, “the ICD functional area 
analysis (FAA) was conducted using a flow-down approach linking strategic guidance, 
joint concept guidance, individual Service guidance and all Service task lists” (U.S. DOD 
2005, 2). The FAA categorized the tasks, standards and conditions using the find, fix, 
track, target, engage and assess (F2T2EA) kill chain and identified the following 
capability gaps: 
• Gap 1 – The ability to transmit and receive the required targeting 
information from ISR&T sources to fires command and control systems 
• Gap 2 – The ability to engage moving point and moving area targets under 
restricted weather conditions 
• Gap 3 – The ability to engage known and/or identified targets when 
friendly forces are in close contact or when collateral damage is a concern 
• Gap 4 – The ability to provide fires to achieve volume effects (i.e., 
suppression) (U.S. DOD 2005) 
The ICD for Joint Fires states that “the results of the target and engage capability 
gap analysis confirmed that existing fielded and program-of-record systems have 
shortcomings that limit the ability of the Commander to employ joint fires against the 
target sets expected during the MCO and GWOT campaign scenario” (U.S. DOD 2005, 
7). 
 10 
2. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting 
The definitions of ISR&T are provided below. 
Intelligence: “1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, 
integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning 
foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or 
potential operations.  2. The activities that result in the product.  3. The organizations 
engaged in such activities” (U.S. DOD 2014a, 128). 
Surveillance: “The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface 
areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other 
means” (U.S. DOD 2014a, 254). 
Reconnaissance: “A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other 
detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or 
adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic 
characteristics of a particular area” (U.S. DOD 2014a, 221). 
Targeting is “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching 
appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities” 
(U.S. DOD 2014a, 260). 
The Joint Fires ICD identified the following capability gaps associated with 
collecting ISR&T data: 
• The ability to transmit and receive the required targeting information from 
ISR&T sources to fires command and control systems. 
• The ability to engage moving point and moving area targets under 
restricted weather conditions. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) perform useful 
surveillance and presence roles (Chew 2008). They have the distinct advantage of being 
able to operate without incurring risks to human life (Chew 2008). They can also operate 
under harsh environmental conditions (Chew 2008). This will significantly increase the 
situational awareness of ships in a coalition and also the United States’ value as a useful 
partner. USVs should continue to feature in our future deployments (Chew 2008).  
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The ICD for Unmanned Systems documents a material solution (i.e., unmanned 
systems) for additional gaps associated with ISR&T capabilities. The capability gaps 
identified in the ICD, written in 2010, remain applicable to the current fleet and have 
been determined to apply to amphibious operations. The specific missions, tasks, and 
functions related to the joint fires F2T2EA kill chain identified in the ICD that cannot 
currently be performed or are unacceptably limited and are experienced during 
amphibious operations include: 
• “The ability to conduct persistent multi-discipline intelligence collection, 
near-real-time reallocation, and dynamic re-tasking of assets.  […] This 
gap is an issue of both sufficiency (insufficient number of intelligence 
collection assets) and a lack of capability (limited sensing and endurance 
of assets)” (U.S. DOD 2010, 7). 
• “The sufficient capability to deliver lethal and non-lethal fires, field-
scalable munitions, and advanced technologies (electromagnetic, high 
power microwave, and high pulse lasers), where manned systems are 
limited, restricted, denied entry, or unavailable” (U.S. DOD 2010, 7). 
D. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP  
As compared to other U.S. surface combatants, the LCS is a relatively 
inexpensive naval combatant optimized for near-shore missions, with a design 
specifically made for the littoral environment. It is a fast, maneuverable, shallow-draft 
ship that has a reconfigurable single-mission focus and is currently planned to specialize 
in neutralizing mines, small surface crafts, and diesel submarines. The LCS was designed 
with a modular, open-system architecture, allowing flexibility in a dynamic battlespace. It 
can store unmanned air, surface, and underwater vehicles, and boasts onboard sensors, 
weapons, and command and control systems. With the addition of the LCS, the naval and 
joint forces gain operational flexibility for sea superiority and assured access to key naval 
points, as well as a crucial member of the future surface combatant family of ships. There 
are two variants of the LCS: the Lockheed Martin variant (Freedom Class) is based on a 
steel semi-planing monohull, while the General Dynamics variant (Independence Class) 
is based on an aluminum trimaran hull (O’Rourke 2011). 
The LCS is the first Navy shipbuilding program that develops and utilizes the 
seaframe concept, which possesses certain inherent capabilities. The LCS can be outfitted 
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with interchangeable “plug-and-fight” systems packages called mission modules, which 
support a multitude of specific tasks. With an open architecture, the LCS contains 
physical and digital interfaces that support mission module systems, command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems, and common control 
systems for unmanned vehicles. The physical and digital interfaces can also seamlessly 
integrate with the ship’s auxiliary support and C4I systems (U.S. Navy 2004). 
The LCS specializes in carrying MPs that can be installed on the ship. MPs were 
created as a response to an evolving threat environment and the emergence of warfighting 
gaps in coastal environments (U.S. Navy 2004). A MP consists of mission modules, 
support aircraft, and the crew associated with the mission modules and aircraft. Mission 
modules consist of mission systems (e.g., vehicles, sensors, and weapons) and associated 
support equipment that install on the seaframe via standard interfaces (U.S. Navy n.d.). 
Support aircraft may consist of manned or unmanned rotary-wing aircraft, as supported 
by the LCS hangar and flight deck. The crew includes the personnel required to operate 
and maintain the MP to achieve the given mission. Figure 3 depicts the association of 
mission modules, support aircraft, and crew that make up a MP. 
 
 
Figure 3 Mission Package Composition (from Ailes 2014) 
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The three MPs currently planned for the LCS are specialized for mine 
countermeasure (MCM), surface warfare (SUW) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
missions. LCS seaframes with MCM MPs will replace the current inventory of mine 
countermeasure ships. The SUW MP will complement and expand existing fleet 
capabilities to neutralize small boat threats in the littorals. The ASW MP will augment 
existing fleet capacity to counter the expanding threat posed by quiet diesel submarines. 
Importantly, the versatility and lift capacity of the LCS seaframe could support a wide 
range of secondary missions, including transport of Marine and special operations forces, 
afloat staging base support, and sea-based fire support (U.S. Navy, USMC, USCG 2010).  
Figure 4 depicts the three currently planned LCS mission packages. 
 
Figure 4 LCS Mission Packages (from Ailes 2014) 
The open architecture seaframe concept allows the LCS to respond to the ever-
evolving threat environment. All MPs are intended to be interchangeable between both 
LCS class ships and can be swapped for a different MP in a short time period. This 
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unique capability provides commanders flexibility in the ever-changing warfighting 
environment. 
1. Surface Warfare Mission Package 
The LCS will use its speed, organic weapons capability, embarked aviation, and 
unmanned surface vehicle capability to provide a layered defense against surface threats 
in coastal areas. To optimize this capability, a LCS engaged in surface warfare will utilize 
a SUW MP to augment its own sensors and weapons to improve detection and 
engagement capability. The LCS operating in support of a CSG or expeditionary strike 
group (ESG), or as part of a surface action group (SAG), will have the C4I ability to 
transmit and receive operational and tactical data. LCS SUW operations will also enable 
the Joint Force Commander to assess the situation in the battlespace and optimally 
position and defend a seabase, maximizing overall force support and power projection.  
Table 2 lists the mission systems that make up the LCS SUW MP. 
 LCS SUW MP Mission Systems (after Schoenster 2008) Table 2
 
Mission Systems Quantity 
Gun Mission Module  
30mm Automatic Cannon 2 
Surface-to-Surface Missile Module   
Launchers 3 
Missiles 45 
Aviation Module  
MH-60R Helicopter 1 
Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Air Vehicle (VTUAV) 2 
Maritime Security Module  
11m rigid-hull inflatable motorboat 2 
Berthing Modules with gear storage 2 
Head/Shower Module  
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2. Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Package 
Operating in direct support of a CSG or ESG, or as part of a forward-deployed 
group, the LCS ASW MP concept is to rapidly deploy and monitor multiple distributed 
sensors and to employ unmanned vehicles and other off-board systems networked to a 
common undersea picture to detect, classify, track, and engage target submarines. The 
LCS will play a significant role within all three task force ASW functional components, 
specifically:  
• Hold at risk potential threat submarines throughout the theater of 
operations 
• Ensure the protected passage of friendly maritime forces and re-supply 
shipping along sea lines of communication and transit lanes 
• Maintain a maritime shield that will deny submarine access to any seabase 
or operating area being employed by CSGs or ESGs.  
In conducting these ASW missions, the LCS will leverage multiple distributed 
sensors and utilize a host of unmanned and manned off-board vehicles to form a large, 
well-coordinated acoustic and non-acoustic sensor/weapon footprint. The LCS ASW MP 
will employ anti-submarine and anti-torpedo self-defense techniques and technologies. 
Signature-control techniques will provide the added advantage of lowering the 
probability of detection of the LCS by an enemy torpedo.  Table 3 shows the mission 








 LCS ASW MP Mission Systems (after Schoenster 2008) Table 3
 
Mission Systems Quantity 
ASW Escort Module  
Variable Depth Sonar 1 
Multi-Function Towed Array Acoustic Receiver 1 
Sonobuoys 1 
Torpedo Defense Module  
Warning: MFTA with Acoustic Intercept 1 
Countermeasures: Light Weight Tow 2 
MK 54 Torpedo  
Aviation Module  
MH-60R Helicopter with Airborne Low Frequency Sonar 1 
VTUAV 2 
Unmanned Vehicle  
USV Towed Array Systems 2 
USV Dipping Sonar 1 
Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle 2 
 
3. Mine Countermeasure Mission Package 
As part of the MCM MP, unmanned vehicles and MH-60S helicopters will hunt 
the water column to accurately detect and identify mines in the targeted operating area. 
When required, MH-60S helicopters, USVs, or explosive-ordnance detachment personnel 
will conduct sweeping and/or neutralization operations of identified mines. If missions do 
not include mine-hunting operations, MH-60S helicopters and USVs will conduct 
influence-sweeping operations in intended operating areas. The LCS will incorporate 
signature-reduction design and signature-management technology to maximize the ship’s 
ability to operate in littoral areas. The LCS ability to control its acoustic and magnetic 
signatures will improve combat effectiveness significantly and be a major advantage over 
current warships. The combination of manned and unmanned vehicles allows organic 
MCM operations to be conducted around the clock.  Table 4 shows the mission systems 




 LCS MCM MP – Mission Systems (after Schoenster 2008) Table 4
 
Mission Systems Quantity 
Remote Minehunting Module  
AN/WLD-1(V) Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle 2 
Mine Hunting Sonar 3 
Near Surface Detection Module  
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System 1 
Airborne Mine Neutralization Module  
MH-60S 1 
Airborne Mine Neutralization System 1 
Coastal Mine Reconnaissance Module  
Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis System 1 
VTUAV 2 
Unmanned Mine Sweeping Module  
USV 1 
Unmanned Surface Sweep System 1 
Buried Mine Hunting Module  
Surface Mine Countermeasure Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 2 
 
4. LCS Concept of Employment 
The concept of employment for the LCS ship class is to operate multiple 
platforms as SAGs configured to conduct a single focused mission (for example, two to 
three LCS platforms configured to conduct the SUW mission). Similarly, the ships may 
be formed-up in a SAG comprised of four to six ships operating together and providing 
mutual support but configured as a group to execute two or three focused missions (i.e., 
two ships configured for MCM, two ships configured for ASW and two ships configured 
for SUW or another mission). The senior LCS commanding officer serving as SAG 
commander will exercise command and control from designated command and control 
centers. 
The operational and tactical control of the LCS, whether operating as part of a 
surface action group or in company with a CSG or ESG, will follow the same traditional 
organizational command and control structure customarily used in today’s fleet forces 
(U.S. Navy 2004).  “An ESG combines an ARG/MEU with the combat power of surface 
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and submarine combatants” (Hutchins et al. 2005, 3). Based on this existing definition, an 
ARG deployed with an LCS or LCS squadron would be considered an ESG. 
Figure 5 shows how the LCS will be employed with a CSG/ESG. When 
deploying as part of a CSG or ESG, the strike group composition will include two to 
three LCS-class ships. The LCS platforms will execute specific missions that have been 
determined a threat from the commanding officer of the CSG or ESG. As the CSG and 
ESG continue its primary mission, the LCS conducts operations in confined waters in 
advance of the CSG/ESG (U.S. Navy 2004). 
 
Figure 5 LCS MPs Diagram (from Lockheed Martin n.d.) 
E. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The ARG operates independently without the support of a SAG. As a result, MEU 
operations requiring joint fires necessitate the deployment of a SAG in order to support 
the ARG during amphibious operations. Deployment of a SAG to support amphibious 
operations is not always feasible due to a limited quantity of naval platforms capable of 
providing surface fires and the need for those platforms to conduct other operations (e.g., 
ballistic missile defense, anti-air warfare, and undersea warfare). 
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Further, the platform intended to supplement the existing fleet of surface fires 
platforms, the Zumwalt class destroyer, has been cut from delivery of 32 platforms to a 
total of only three platforms. This decision exacerbates the capability gap associated with 
the ability to provide joint fires in support of amphibious operations. 
With these facts in mind, as well as the joint fires capability gaps discussed above, 
this project considers the following problem statement: 
The ARG lacks the adequate capability to employ fires and perform ISR&T data 
collection in support of amphibious operations. 
The LCS CONOPS describes the LCS platform operating in the amphibious 
theater of operations. The LCS platform is the only surface combatant designed 
specifically for the littorals—its support of amphibious warfare is an obvious 
consideration. Further, in a letter with the subject “USMC Integration with Freedom—
Variant Mission Modules,” Commander Wilke lists nine potential amphibious mission 
areas for LCS that provide insight into how LCS can fulfill current gaps in amphibious 
warfare (AMW): 
• Launch small USMC force to conduct an amphibious raid 
• Launch pre-assault beach survey teams 
• Launch special operations forces 
• Conduct close in gunfire support using electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR)-
targeted 57 mm smart fused rounds at a rate of 200 rounds per minute. 
• Deliver humanitarian assistance supplies. 
• Support humanitarian aid and disaster relief as fast ferry to transport 
victims from shore to amphibious shipping. 
• Support noncombatant extraction operations as a fast ferry from shore to 
amphibious shipping. 
• Provide real time airborne surveillance utilizing the MH-60 helicopter and 
Firescout VTUAV with their associated EO/IR and electronic support 
sensors and data links.  
• Provide helicopter-launched Hellfire missiles to support amphibious 
forces ashore. (Wilke 2014) 
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In order to address the problem statement listed above, and given the aspects of 
LCS discussed above, this project focuses on answering the following research questions: 
• What threats exist for an ARG/MEU during amphibious operations? 
• What alternatives exist for providing joint fires capability with a LCS 
mission package? 
• Could LCS provide effective joint fire support? 
• What would the most cost-effective LCS mission package be to support 
amphibious operations? 
F. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
In order to answer the questions listed above, this project  
• Evaluated existing documentation to identify capability gaps associated 
with amphibious operations, 
• Developed a design reference mission (DRM) in order to characterize the 
environment in which the potential solutions would operate, 
• Identified the operational requirements necessary for the system to 
adequately support amphibious operations, 
• Developed the operational, functional, and physical architecture of 
potential solutions to meet the defined capability need, 
• Identified the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to be used in evaluating 
the potential solutions, 
• Built a discrete-event model to evaluate the effectiveness of the potential 
solutions in terms of the identified MOEs, 
• Generated cost estimates for each of the potential solutions, and 
• Performed an analysis of alternatives of the potential solutions to identify 
the most cost-effective solution. 
The first step (identify capability gaps from existing documentation) was 
performed via research, as discussed above, and informed the decision to focus on joint 
fires and ISR&T operations. The remainder of this paper discusses the methodology and 
results of the subsequent steps. 
This project applied a tailored system engineering (SE) process to analyze the 
potential solutions for this multi-faceted problem. After considering the many different 
ways to approach a problem that affects all services in the DOD, it was determined the 
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SE process would best serve the project’s objectives by focusing on the phases and 
deliverables shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 Tailored Systems Engineering Process 
The first phase of the tailored SE process focused on the problem presented 
above. This phase included identifying the existing capability gaps and describing the 
operational situation(s) associated with the use of the LCS in amphibious operations. This 
phase resulted in the generation of a capability gap analysis, DRM, and operational 
requirements. This phase identified existing gaps documented in existing literature, and 
established the MOEs of the potential solution. 
 The developed DRM and operational requirements were then used to identify 
alternative solutions. In this phase, alternative designs that address the problem and meet 
the needs described in the first phase of the process were developed through functional 
analysis and allocation. The developed architectures were used in the following steps for 
assessing the effectiveness of the proposed solutions. 
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The third phase of the process was modeling and simulation. This phase evaluated 
the proposed solutions against the MOEs identified during the first phase. Models and 
simulations were used to evaluate proposed architectures and obtain metrics as defined by 
a design of experiments. The collected metrics supported the overall analysis of 
alternatives performed during the next phase. 
The final phase of the tailored SE process included cost estimation and an 
analysis of alternatives, using cost as an independent variable, to identify the best value 
solution to the specific capability gaps identified in the first phase. 
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II. SYSTEM CONTEXT 
In order to understand the operational context of the proposed solution (i.e., an 
LCS AMW MP (LAMP)), this project considered the navy tactical tasks required to be 
performed by a LAMP and developed a DRM to describe the environment in which the 
LAMP would be expected to operate. Operational requirements were then defined based 
on the environment described in the DRM. 
A. NAVY TACTICAL TASKS 
The Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) “provides a common language that 
commanders can use to document their command warfighting requirements as mission 
essential tasks” (U.S. Navy, USMC, USCG 2007, 2). For this project, the UNTL was 
used to further characterize the identified capability gaps due to its consistency and 
acceptance for describing the DoN operational activities. As part of this process, each 
capability gap discussed above (i.e., ISR&T data collection and fires employment) was 
analyzed to identify the naval tactical activities (NTAs) that must be performed in order 
to address the given gap.   
The Unmanned Systems and Surface Fires ICDs, as well as the POM-16 MCGL, 
document capability gaps related to NTA 2 “Develop Intelligence.”  The documented 
gaps relate to real-time monitoring of the battlespace, collection of targeting data in 
support of direct and indirect fires, and dynamic reallocation of ISR&T assets. In general, 
these gaps most closely align with the performance of collection operation and 
management (NTA 2.2), the conduct of analysis and production of intelligence (NTA 
2.4), and the dissemination and integration of intelligence (NTA 2.5). 
The ICD for Joint Fires specifically relates to the employment of fires in support 
of joint operations, directly related to NTA 3 “Employ Firepower.”  Specific to the 
documented gaps, the required NTAs relate to the application of firepower against 
ground targets. Key activities employed during the fires mission are the abilities to 
process and attack targets. Target processing (NTA 3.1) includes the identification and 
selection of land targets and the selection of appropriate use of firepower systems. 
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Attacking targets consists of engagement of the enemy in which assets will destroy, 
degrade, or disable targets using all available organic firepower. Attacking targets (NTA 
3.2) will consist of all lethal and nonlethal actions, both defensive and offensive.   
The identified NTAs serve as a starting point for describing the system context. 
The remainder of this chapter further decomposes the identified NTAs to more specific 
operational activities that the final solution may perform to address the identified 
capability gaps. This decomposition is primarily accomplished through the development 
of the system’s DRM. 
B. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION OVERVIEW 
A DRM was depicted utilizing a joint phased campaign scenario. This approach 
was chosen in order to characterize the environment and better understand the activities 
to be performed by a LAMP during amphibious operations. The number of LCS 
platforms forward deployed in support of the ARG is assumed to be three; this research 
effort makes the further assumption that all three LCS platforms will have the same 
AMW mission package installed.   
The DRM for the LAMP was built around the existing “Treasure Coast” scenario 
that is used for both the Bold Alligator series of MEB/ESG trainings exercise and for the 
ARG/MEU certification exercises used for deploying East Coast ARG/MEUs.   The 
DRM focuses on the phase one (Deter) and phase two (Seize the Initiative) of an 
amphibious operation, during which the LAMP is expected to provide direct support of 
an ARG/MEU providing tactical control (TACON). The five phases of an amphibious 
operation are shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Phases of an Amphibious Operation (from Riccio 2013) 
While an ESG and MEB assume control of the main effort during phase three of 
an amphibious operation, the ARG/MEU remains a separate maneuver element. As a 
separate naval task force, the forward deployed ARG/MEU remains a separate naval task 
force under the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander. In direct support to the 
ARG/MEU, the LAMP will provide its own TACON during the amphibious raid with 
limited or no additional forces.  
The operational situation (OPSIT) of the LAMP DRM consists of an amphibious 
raid mission in order to explore the identified fires employment and ISR&T data 
collection capabilities gaps under consideration. Upon arrival of the ARG/MEU in phase 
0 of the amphibious operation, ISR&T operational planning will take place between all 
ISR participation planners and naval commanders. This planning will account for all 
available assets and will address intended routes/zones, responsible intelligence data 
processor(s), and the responsible dissemination organization(s). During this time, some 
organic ARG/MEU assets will provide immediate area reconnaissance in support of 
ARG/MEU protection. 
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As phase one of the amphibious operation is initiated, the ISR&T assets will 
perform forward operations at the coastline and further in to the hostile area. ISR data 
collection will include a multitude of information for assault planning, such as coastal 
surf conditions, reinforced coastal emplacements, enemy anti-access and aerial denial 
(A2AD) systems, and enemy troop size estimates and locations. The assumed area of 
responsibility during this search is estimated at 10,000 square nautical miles. 
At the initiation of phase 2, the ISR&T assets will continue collecting ISR&T data 
in support of threat engagement. During this phase, the LAMP is also expected to engage 
targets based on targeting data received from ISR&T assets organic to the LAMP as well 
as data received from off-platform. 
1. Concept of Operations 
The LAMP DRM consists of a vertical and horizontal slice of live operational 
forces involved during amphibious operations, consisting of a MEU LF operation center, 
ARG supporting arms coordination center (SACC), and LCS squadron command. The 
LCS squadron consists of three LCS platforms configured with AMW MPs.   For the 
MEU, a reinforced Marine Battalion Landing Team serves as the ground combat element. 
The maneuver element of the MEU consists of one rifle company, flown in by twelve 
MV-22s. The rifle company is a mechanized Marine infantry company in twelve 
amphibious assault vehicles. The rifle company is the primary force the LAMP must 
provide fire support for both before and during the maneuver. 
2. Projected Operating Environment 
The POE is the environment in which the system is expected to operate. This 
section provides details that describe the environmental conditions, types of locations, 
and threats for which the LAMP must be designed to meet the desired operational 
capabilities. The POE establishes a context within which operational tasks are expected 
be executed by the potential solution in order to define measurable outcomes in support 
of making design decisions. 
 28 
a. Environmental Conditions 
Fire support systems are expected to support operations throughout the spectrum 
of conflict “during ideal and restricted weather, terrain and [rules of engagement] 
conditions” (U.S. DOD 2005, 6). The LAMP is expected to operate in:   
• Littoral environments with sand barrier islands and intracoastal 
waterways, 
• Sea state one to three, or up to the limits of amphibious operations for both 
air and surface connectors, 
• Daytime and nighttime conditions, and 
• Temperatures greater than -40° F and less than 140° F. 
b. Assumed Threat General Conditions 
For the LAMP DRM, enemy forces have crossed the North Garnet border 
southward into Amberland in an attempt to perform a hostile takeover of the Amberland 
capital, air terminal, and seaports. Enemy forces occupy most of Amberland as well as 
the Amber Territory, to the south of Amberland. Force strength in the Amber Territory is 
estimated to be sparse; larger enemy numbers and mechanized forces are believed to 
mainly remain in Amberland. Though both Amberland and Amber Territories are not 
considered to be allies, the U.S. believes that this hostile act is detrimental and disruptive 
on a much larger scale.  Figure 8 depicts the political geography of the POE. 
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Figure 8 Situation Map from Exercise Bold Alligator (from Riccio 
2013) 
At the Garnet coastline (south of Amber) and the southern Amber coastline, the 
enemy will employ A2AD systems, particularly air defense systems, with the objective to 
prevent the deployment of U.S. forces into the area of responsibility (AOR). In 
Amberland and the northern portions of the Amber territory, enemy A2AD capabilities 
are not fully deployed. A2AD systems will interfere with the freedom of maneuver of any 
aviation assets used for ISR&T, fire support, or transport. Identification of these A2AD 
systems is the priority during ISR&T operations, and these will be high priority targets in 
fire support operations prior to deployment of the rifle company in order to ensure that 
the rifle company can successfully maneuver within the AOR.  
Further, an enemy mechanized infantry brigade, as the lead and advance elements 
of an associated mechanized corps, has reached into Amberland territory. The enemy 
forces are expected to employ Russian ground combined arms tactics, coupled with the 
employment of special operations, to shape the environment throughout Amberland and 
the Amber territory. Combined arms tactics consist of the appropriate combinations of 
two or more arms elements, such as ground forces, air elements, offensive and defensive 
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fire support in a unified action.  Table 5 shows the major elements of the mechanized 
infantry brigade, estimated between 3000–5000 enemy personnel. 




Figure 9 illustrates the terrain coastline where the ARG/MEU amphibious 
operations will occur. Objective one is an airfield capable of supporting heavy transport, 
bomber, and tactical aircraft. Also shown in Figure 9 are the other primary objectives for 
the MEU raid force: objective two comprises of the marine shipping terminal and 
objective three consists of a medium length runway capable of supporting additional 
aerial assets. The yellow hexagon included in Figure 9 depicts the city of Jacksonville, 
the Amberland capital -- which significant enemy forces are expected to occupy. The 
LAMP is expected to support the MEU force performing an amphibious raid on objective 
one, but the presence of other objectives and tactical operations in the vicinity will 




Figure 9 Terrain Sample for the “Treasure Coast” (Intlink Photo) 
c. Threat Approach Variants 
Threat approaches aimed against the LAMP, including any associated aviation 
assets, include: 
• Air attack, 
• Surface attack, 
• Anti-ship missile attack, 
• Rockets, artillery and mortars, 
• Sea mines, and 
• Electronic warfare and cyber-attack. 
Threats approaches aimed against the ARG/MEU include the above threats plus: 
• Enemy ground forces listed in Table 5 and 
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• Enemy special operations in four- to ten-man elements employing 
ambushes and controlling supporting arms 
3. Mission Success Requirements 
For this DRM, mission success requirements of the LAMP include: 
• The LAMP shall provide ISR&T capabilities that aid in the successful 
execution per the specific tactical mission in the OPSIT. 
• The LAMP shall provide fires capabilities (both naval surface fires and 
aviation fires) that aid in the successful execution per the specific tactical 
mission in the OPSIT. 
Specific MOEs for the LAMP system include: 
• MOE 1:  Percent of targets identified in four hours   
• MOE 2:  Time between system receipt of fire mission and target impact  
• MOE 3:  Percentage of targets successfully affected  
In order for the mission to be considered successful, the above requirements must 
be met. To further scope this analysis, these mission success requirements will be 
assessed in the context of specific mission threads of the particular OPSIT.   
4. Mission Definition 
Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) provide the operational context for more specific 
military functions that apply broadly across the range of military operations. In order to 
help with the selection and modeling of the necessary LAMP operational activities, the 
JCAs associated with the LAMP (as required by the DRM) were documented. Table 6 
shows the appropriate first two tiers of the JCAs, with areas directly related to the LAMP 







 Joint Capability Areas Applicable to the LAMP (after U.S. Table 6
DOD 2011) 
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The ability to understand dispositions and 
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conditions of the operational environment that 











The ability to integrate the use of maneuver and 
Battlespace Awareness engagement in all 
environments to create the effects necessary to 


















The ability to project and sustain a logistically 
ready joint force through the deliberate sharing of 
national and multi-national resources to effectively 
support operations, extend operational reach and 
provide the joint force commander the freedom of 


























The ability to exercise authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander or decision maker 
over assigned and attached forces and resources in 













In order to identify the activities required to support LAMP mission success, the 
identified capability gaps were traced to the JCAs, and the JCAs were traced to the 
operational activities required to accomplish those capabilities. This matrix between 
capability gaps, JCAs, and operational activities, documented as the LAMP CV-6, is 
provided as Appendix B.  
The LAMP operational activities were developed based upon the NTAs discussed 
in the previous section. The following high-level operational activities, based on the top-
level activities of the UNTL, were allocated to the LAMP during the development of this 




Top Level Operational Activity: 
• OA.0 Conduct AMW Support for the ARG/MEU 
First Level Operational Activities: 
• OA.1 Deploy/Conduct Maneuver, which includes deploying and 
maneuvering the assets required for ISR&T and fire support 
• OA.2 Develop Intelligence, which includes the collection and processing 
of combat information and intelligence products to provide ISR&T data 
• OA.3 Conduct Fire Support, which includes the actual fire support 
activities 
• OA.4 Perform Logistic and Combat Service Support, which includes any 
activities required to sustain the LAMP, including fueling assets, loading 
and reloading ammunition, and performing any necessary preventive or 
corrective maintenance 
• OA.5 Exercise Command and Control, which includes controlling any 
mission package assets deployed off of the platform, providing collected 
information and intelligence to those who require it, and communicating 
fire mission status 
5. Mission Execution 
While fire support and ISR&T data collection are required to be employed across 
the full spectrum of operations, the LAMP DRM was designed to assess a subset of the 
required mission capabilities in the context of certain missions executed during 
amphibious operations. 
Figure 10 represents a high-level operational view of the LAMP. During 
operations, the LAMP is employed in direct support of the ARG/MEU. The LAMP 
includes assets that detect threats and provide situational awareness in the littoral 
operating area. If and when the AOR is determined to be clear of enemy threats, the 
LAMP continues to search for emergent threats within the AOR. The LAMP provides an 
extension of current ARG/MEU assets and alerts operators and commanders of potential 
threats in the area before, during and/or after deployment of water-borne and aircraft-
borne assets into the AOR. The LAMP also supports amphibious operations with direct 
fire support and provides ARG/MEU commanders with organic fires capability. The 
LAMP provides support for mission planning, planned fires, the identification and 
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engagement of targets of opportunity, quick response surface fires, and post engagement 
assessment. 
 
Figure 10 LAMP High Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1) 
6. Amphibious Raid OPSIT 
For the OPSIT, the enemy mechanized infantry brigade main body is located at 
Jacksonville in order to maintain control of major supply transportation routes. Enemy 
company-sized elements surround objectives one and two. The enemy company elements 
consist of ten troop carriers, four tanks, and shoulder-launched man-portable air defense 
systems. Motorized anti-air asset locations are currently unknown within the AOR. 
Both the amphibious raid and amphibious demonstration will be supported by 
close air support and NSFS to the fullest extent possible. Possible missions for LAMP 
during the conduct of operations by the ARG/MEU include: 
• Provide fire support and ISR&T data collection in support of the 
amphibious raid  
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• Provide fire support and ISR&T data collection in support of a tactical 
recovery of aircraft and personnel mission, in the event an air asset is shot 
down or crashes during the primary mission 
• Provide fire support and ISR&T data collection in order to prevent any 
enemy armored counterattack against the MEU raid force during or after 
their seizure of objective one 
C. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Operational requirements describe the identified capabilities and the associated 
needs of the system and identify the essential capabilities, performance measures, and 
processes needed to address the mission. The LAMP operational requirements are based 
on the capability gaps, JCAs, and operational requirements discussed in the previous 
section. Objective and threshold values of the LAMP operational requirements are based 
on the Joint Fires ICD, Unmanned Systems ICD, and the environment described in the 
DRM. 
Two capability gaps associated with fires support were identified in the Joint Fires 
ICD. The first gap identified is the ability to engage known and/or identified targets when 
friendly forces are in close contact or when collateral damage is a concern. The second 
gap identified the ability to provide fires to achieve volume effects. These capability gaps 
include the sustained rate of fire, probability of damage, and range. 
The Joint Fires ICD listed specific MOEs for providing fire support, with desired 
minimum values included. Acquisition programs of record that provide fires support 
capabilities require varying ranges and rates of fire; the LAMP operational requirements 
associated with fires support are based on the specific MOEs from the Joint Fires ICD. 
1. The LAMP shall provide joint fires in support of amphibious operations.  
• The LAMP shall have a sustained rate of fire of five rounds per 
minute (T); 10 rounds per minute (O). 
• The LAMP shall have a 40% (near term) Probability of Damage 
(PD) against targets (T); 70% (long term) Probability of Damage 
(PD) against targets (O). 
• The LAMP shall have an engagement range of 13 nautical miles 
(mid-term) (T) and 110 nautical miles (mid-term) (O). 
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The ISR&T NTAs were analyzed to identify the operational requirements 
associated with the ISR&T-related capability gaps and JCAs described in the DRM. The 
NTAs associated with the ISR&T JCAs are most accurately described in terms of 
operational range; the geography of the AOR described in the DRM was used to identify 
threshold and objective ranges for LAMP ISR&T capabilities.   
2. The LAMP shall perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
support of amphibious operations. 
• The LAMP shall conduct reconnaissance at a range of 50 nautical 
miles (T) 100 nautical miles (O). 
The LCS platform is limited and can only house a limited amount of assets that 
will fit on the platform safely and securely, while taking account the operational 
environment. The LCS interface control document details the requirements and 
constraints levied on a LCS MP. 




III. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS AND ALLOCATION 
With the system context described by the DRM and operational requirements, the 
project focused on further development of the LAMP operational architecture, definition 
of the required functional architecture, and identification of the potential physical 
architectures of the LAMP. These artifacts were developed through functional analysis 
and allocation, as further described in this chapter. 
Functional analysis is an iterative process of translating high-level system 
capability requirements into progressively more detailed design requirements. This 
process develops the top-level system architecture, which deals with both requirements 
and structure. The purpose of functional analysis is to present an overall integrated and 
composite description of the system’s functional architecture, to establish a functional 
baseline for all subsequent design and development activities, and to provide a 
foundation for the system’s physical architecture (Blanchard & Fabrycky 2011).  
The functional analysis approach to system refinement helps ensure that all facets 
of system design and development for the entire system life cycle are considered; all 
required elements of the system are recognized and defined, including elements that exist 
for support, maintenance, production, disposal, and other non-tactical uses; a means 
exists to relate support requirements to specific system functions, satisfying the 
requirements of a good functional design and ensuring that features and requirements are 
included where necessary and not where unnecessary; proper sequences of activities, 
design relationships, and critical interfaces are established; and there is traceability from 
the system capability need and top-level requirements down to detailed system, 
subsystem, and element functional requirements (Blanchard 2008). 
Functional allocation is the process by which closely related system functions are 
grouped into packages employing a common resource, with each “package,” or system 
element, as independent as possible (Blanchard & Fabrycky 2011), ultimately assigning 
the required functionality to the required physical elements of the system. This effort 
continues to decompose the system elements down to the lowest level practical. As 
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applied to the LAMP, this decomposition process continued to the point at which existing 
systems could be evaluated for their potential to perform required functionality without 
artificially constraining the potential options because of how functionality was grouped 
and allocated.  
A. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
The process of functional analysis and allocation is the central portion of the 
“Identify Alternatives” block in the tailored systems engineering process approach 
selected for this project. The SE process, described in Chapter I, Section F, identifies 
several key items, particularly the capability gap analysis, DRM, and operational 
requirements developed in the previous step, that are necessary inputs to functional 
analysis and allocation. The SE process also indicates the expected outputs of this 
effort—i.e., alternative solutions and the architecture of those alternatives. 
Functional analysis began with the capability gaps identified by the capability gap 
assessment. As was discussed in earlier chapters, the capability gaps were traced to 
capabilities and to NTAs (i.e., the LAMP operational activities) in order to capture the 
specific tasks required to meet the capability needed. This was captured as part of the 
DRM refinement.  
The LAMP operational activities were, in turn, used to derive the LAMP system 
functions; system functions were then traced to operational activities to ensure complete 
coverage of the activities identified as part of DRM refinement and operational 
architecture development. System functions were then grouped and allocated to system 
elements, which are specific hardware, software, firmware, and human operators that 
perform the functions in question. Further definition, refinement, or decomposition of 
capabilities, operational activities, system functions, and/or system elements drove 
corresponding feedback and changes to other portions of the architecture; development of 
the system architecture was an exercise in iteration and feedback. As the architecture was 
decomposed, each area was reexamined and feedback incorporated to ensure the 
architecture remained self-consistent. 
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B. ARCHITECTURE TOOL AND LANGUAGE SELECTION 
Architecture tools allow the system architect to enforce formal rules of 
architecture development and ensure consistency across views and viewpoints 
(Giammarco 2010). For this effort, an architecture tool was required to (1) support 
simultaneous, collaborative work amongst geographically distributed individuals, (2) 
provide Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) v2.0 views, (3) allow 
simple import and export of data, and (4) allow tailoring of the schema. Based on these 
criteria, Innoslate (developed by SPEC Innovations) was selected for use. 
While Innoslate natively uses Life Cycle Modeling Language, Innoslate’s native 
language was not used. Instead, the Innoslate features to tailor language and label classes 
were used to implement the desired language. Innoslate is capable of supporting DoDAF 
views in widely used graphical formats, meaning the tool could still produce desired 
architecture products. 
DoDAF v2.0 definitions of terms and expected relationships between different 
classes are familiar to the expected audience of this report. As a result, DoDAF was 
already planned for use in determining and constructing appropriate architecture views to 
communicate the results of the functional analysis. Further, DoDAF is well suited for 
capturing the high-level operational and enterprise interactions that are key to expressing 
how the system under development must operate within the larger context of the ARG/
MEU, and DoDAF has classes and relationships that capture the information critical to 
this system. Therefore, DoDAF definitions were used in the development of the 
architecture. In order to avoid any confusion between DoDAF definitions of common 
terms and definitions within other architecture languages readers may be familiar with, 
Table 7 captures commonly used architecture terms as they are defined within the 






 Definition of Commonly Used Architecture Terms (after Table 7
U.S. Navy 2011a) 
 
Name Definition 
Capability The ability to achieve a desired effect under specified [performance] 
standards and conditions through combinations of ways and means 
[activities and resources] to perform a set of activities. 
Data Representation of information in a formalized manner suitable for 
communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by automatic 
means.  
Entity An entity is the representation of a set of real or abstract things (e.g., 
people, places, events, or ideas) recognized as the same type because they 




An Activity, Process, or transformation (modeled by an IDEF0 box) 
identified by a verb or a verb phrase that describes what shall be 
accomplished. Called System Function in this thesis to distinguish 
between external functions and other general use of the word function. 
Link A representation of the physical realization of connectivity between 
Systems or Service. 
Needline A Needline represents the logical expression and documents the 
requirement of the need to transfer resources and do not indicate ‘how’ 
the resource is exchanged.  
Operational 
Activity 
An Activity is an action performed in conducting the business of the 
Enterprise. It is a general term that does not imply any place in a 




An organized assembly of resources and procedures united and regulated 
by interaction or interdependence to accomplish a set of specific 
Functions. Called System Elements in this thesis to clarify that they may 
be pieces (e.g., subsystems, assemblies, components, parts, or 
subassemblies) of the system under development. 
 
C. OPERATIONAL CONTEXT 
The first step of the functional analysis was to identify all of the external entities 
and inputs in order to define the boundaries of the system being developed and define the 
external operating environment. This also allowed the identification of required external 
interfaces and the data and resources exchanged across these interfaces. By establishing a 
firm definition of what was external to the system and what must flow in and out, the 
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functional analysis also significantly refined the initial operational activities derived from 
the NTAs identified in the DRM. This feedback was then incorporated in the final DRM.   
Figure 11 shows a simple diagram of these external interfaces. The first interface 
is between the AMW mission package and the LCS platform. The LCS platform must 
provide host services, including power, water, access to networks, and propulsion to the 
area of the interest. The mission package must also interface with the SACC, which is 
responsible for coordinating all of the fire support planning for the ARG/MEU operations 
in this situation. The SACC provides the LAMP with the fire support coordination plan, 
target lists, fire orders, and confirmation (or at least the option to veto) on firing missions 
initiated by a direct call for fire. The SACC has the primary responsibility to pair the 
target with an effective weapon, to the level of assigning a target and fire mission to a 
particular mission package. The LAMP in return must provide status of the fire mission 
and health and status of the MP and weapon systems to allow the SACC to make 
informed decisions about what asset to assign to a fire mission. The joint intelligence 
center (JIC) is responsible for the collection, analysis, integration, and dissemination of 
intelligence to the ARG/MEU, including producing an intelligence collection plan and 
providing operational intelligence requirements to the LAMP. The JIC establishes where 
the LAMP ISR&T assets should look and what data is desired. The LAMP must provide 
combat information and processed intelligence products to the JIC.   
The LAMP also has external interfaces with hostiles and the external 
environment. The mission package sends energy, both in the form of active sensor energy 
and destructive energy from weapon systems, out to the environment and the hostiles in 
the process of attempting to detect and neutralize hostiles—any energy that misses 
hostiles is still sent to the external environment. The environment interacts with the 
LAMP through weather and terrain, which the LAMP detects and may be obstructed by. 
The hostiles, if they are to be detected, must provide some indication of presence, 
whether through emissions or simply being visible.   
The LCS Squadron (LCSRON) and Military Sealift Command (MSC) are 
responsible for logistics support, providing both short-term supply replenishment and 
long term sustainment activities like maintenance and training to the LAMP. The LAMP 
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must provide a status, particularly a logistics demand signal, to the LCSRON and MSC in 
order to indicate what support is currently needed.   
Lastly, the LAMP will have an external interface with fire controllers, which can 
include 81 mm mortar forward observers (FOs), artillery FOs, naval gunfire spotters, 
forward air controllers, joint terminal attack controllers, or any other fire support 
controller in the area of operations. The fire controllers can provide the LAMP a direct 
call for fire, which is a special type of fire mission typically requiring a short turnaround 
time, which would not go through the SACC. In these cases, the SACC nominally must 
approve the direct call for fire, but in reality, this is usually a case of silence-is-consent. 
The LAMP provides the status of the fire mission to the fire controller, allowing 
confirmation that the mission has been successful and adjustment of fires if necessary.  
 
Figure 11 LAMP External Interfaces 
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D. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
The operational activities previously identified for the capability gaps, refined 
based upon the more detailed understanding of system boundaries and necked down 
required capabilities, were also entered into the Innoslate architecture. Once entered, the 
operational activities were traced to the relevant capability. The inputs and outputs of 
each operational activity, including controls, were captured.  Figure 12 shows the 
hierarchy of operational activities associated with the LAMP. The following paragraphs 
describe the operational activities in more detail and capture the data exchanges among 
the operational activities. 
 
Figure 12 LAMP Operational Activity Hierarchy 
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Figure 13 shows the IDEF0 diagram of the first level operational activities 
associated with the LAMP. Note that as the operational activity hierarchy showed, each 
of the first level operational activities has been further decomposed. As a result, the 
majority of the inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms on the IDEF0 diagram are 
shown as tunnels. The first operational activity is OA.1, Deploy/Conduct Maneuver, 
which addresses the activities needed to launch, maneuver, and recover aviation assets 
that are part of the mission package. It does not include maneuvering the LCS itself—this 
is assumed to be an external responsibility of the LCS platform. Deploy/Conduct 
Maneuver receives commands from OA.5, Exercise Command and Control, and fuel and 
sustainment from OA.4. Deploy/Conduct Maneuver outputs include status information 
and raw on-site combat information. At this point, these products are not processed 
intelligence, simply raw information about the aviation assets, including location, status, 
and situation.  
The second operational activity, OA.2, Develop Intelligence, consists of using any 
sensor systems included in the mission package to gather combat information, including 
information about environment, terrain, and enemy forces, and then performs some 
limited processing of combat information in order to provide both intelligence products 
and combat information for local and external use. Note that per the definitions in JP 1–
02, information can only be called intelligence after it has been processed, but that 
processing can be as simple as a human viewing an image and identifying the subject as a 
particular variety of tank.   
The third operational activity is OA.3, Conduct Fire Support, which handles all of 
the tasks required to actually shoot hostiles. OA.5, Exercise Command and Control, 
provides the fire mission information that controls this operational activity, and OA.2, 
Develop Intelligence, provides inputs of combat information and intelligence products. 
OA.4, Perform Logistics and Combat Service Support, provides required sustainment and 
any loading of ammunition required by weapon systems. OA.4 exists for the tactical 
work of refueling and reloading ammunition, but also allows for maintenance activities 
required by the system in order to make the other operational activities possible, such as 
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any sensor calibration or weapon alignment tasks. OA.5, Exercise Command and 
Control, only addresses LAMP command and control of its own assets.  
The SACC will provide the fire support coordination planning, including 
prioritized target lists, desired effects, and de-confliction of targets and fire support with 
friendly units and air traffic. OA.5 takes this as an input, along with all of the system 
status information, and controls the mission package assets in order to accomplish the 
mission assigned to the LAMP. OA.5 generates commands that are received by OA.1 and 
OA.3. OA.5 also provides status information as outputs, including acknowledging calls 
for fire and fire missions assigned by the SACC, providing the status of fire missions to 
the SACC and the fire controller requesting the fire support, and communicating 
collected combat information and processed intelligence to the JIC. 
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Figure 13 First Level Operational Activities IDEF0 Diagram
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E. SYSTEM FUNCTIONS 
System functions were identified to implement the operational activities. At the 
highest levels, the system functions are very similar or identical in wording to the 
operational activities. However, the lower the decomposition, the more specific the 
functions become, until they are specific actions implemented in specific system 
elements.  
Figure 14 shows the functional hierarchy for the LAMP. F.1, Maneuver Aviation 
Asset, includes all of the functionality required to launch, maneuver, employ, and recover 
an aviation asset. F.2, Develop Intelligence, addresses all of the required sensing to assess 
the terrain and environment, collect target information, perform reconnaissance and 
surveillance, process collected information to develop intelligence products, and 
disseminate those products. F.3, Conduct Fire Support, includes all the functionality 
required to effectively employ weapons against targets, including designating the targets 
for engagement, engaging targets directly, interdiction of enemy movements, and 
adjusting fires to provide desired accuracy. F.4, Perform Logistics, only addresses the 
efforts the system must take, not the greater logistics and support system external to the 
LAMP. F.4 includes loading and reloading weapons that expend ammunition, arming or 
charging systems that use electrical energy rather than ammunition cartridges, fueling and 
refueling aviation assets, supporting required maintenance operations, and monitoring the 
logistics status in order to report when maintenance or resupply is required. F.5, Exercise 
Command and Control, addresses only the system’s local command and control of its 
own assets, not the greater command and control of the overall operation. F.5 includes 
managing communications between the system and the external interfacing entities 
shown in the external interfaces diagram, controlling and coordinating the aviation assets 
that are part of the mission package, assessing status and health of mission package 
assets, and assigning received fire missions to specific systems within the mission 
package based upon position and status.   
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Figure 14 Functional Hierarchy 
Figure 15 shows the first level functional flow for the system. At the top-level, 
this is similar to the operational activity diagram except in enhanced functional flow 
block diagram (EFFBD) format rather than IDEF0. This EFFBD shows that all of the 
functions occur in parallel. Data items in green indicate controls for functions, while grey 
color and lines marked optional indicate that the item is an input. Items that are inputs for 
one function but controls for another show in grey, with the input lines marked optional. 
Outputs that are transferred to external functions are also shown in green. In general, 
items on the left of the diagram are inputs from external functions and items to the right 
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are outputs to external functions. The internal functions exchange data and resources with 
each other and external entities. For example, F.4 provides all the logistics required for 
F.1, Maneuver Aviation Asset, and F.3, Conduct Fire Support, to occur, but both of these 
functions provide status back to F.4 that allow it to provide a logistics demand signal. 
Additionally, F.5, Exercise Command and Control, is required to provide commands and 
fire missions to F.1 and F.3, respectively. F.2, Develop Intelligence, can begin only once 
an aviation asset is on station and providing onsite combat information, but it provides 
feedback both external to the system and to F.5, Exercise Command and Control, that 
would result in new or additional aviation asset maneuver commands and fire missions 
based upon the data. 
 
Figure 15 Top-Level Functional Flow 
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In order to ensure that all the operational activities had system functions to 
implement the operational activities in the LAMP, a traceability matrix was generated 
(Appendix C). This also ensured that there were no system functions that did not trace to 
an operational activity and thus were not required to execute the mission outlined in the 
DRM. As the comparison of the operational activity and system function diagrams show, 
at the top level, the operational activities and system functions align well.  
F. SYSTEM ELEMENTS 
Grouping closely related functions and partitioning the resources required by 
those functions into system elements created system elements. The hierarchy of system 
elements is shown in Figure 16. The highest level is the LAMP itself, as this is the system 
being developed to provide AMW support. From there, the system is broken down into 
four major subsystems:  
• A shipboard weapon system, made up of the weapons themselves and the 
delivery system, such as a launcher, bomb rack unit, gun, or catapult, 
required to get the destructive energy to the target;  
• An air detachment, which includes the aviation platforms and their 
onboard sensors and weapons;  
• A command and control (C2) subsystem, which provides local mission 
package control of the assets that belong to the mission package, including 
specific fire control and aviation asset guidance (such as the control 
station for an unmanned system), the communications equipment, and the 
computer processing to handle all the analysis and reporting needed; and  
• A support services subsystem, which includes the distribution of power, 
water, fuel, and ammunition; specific maintenance and support tools; and 
the processing and equipment to allow monitoring of system health.  
The choice of names for system elements have been left as unrestrictive as 
possible to allow as many existing weapon, aviation, and ISR&T systems as possible to 
be considered as potential solutions and avoid excluding options that do meet the 
required functionality. These system elements are the building blocks to allow assessment 
of potential solutions. However, as the major functionality of the system is contained 
within the ISR&T and shooter subsystems, that is the focus of the analysis of alternatives.  
 52 
 
Figure 16 System Element Hierarchy 
The most critical outcome of the functional allocation is the traceability of 
required functionality to the specific portion of the system under development that must 
provide that functionality. This trace is important in assuring that all of the required 
functionality is assigned to a system element (i.e., that required function will be 
implemented in the system) and also that each defined system element has been allocated 
at least one function (i.e., that all system elements are necessary). The trace between 
system functions and system elements has been captured in the system architecture and is 
documented in the LAMP combined Operational Activity to Systems Function 
Traceability Matrix (SV-5a) and Operational Activity to Systems Traceability Matrix 
(SV-5b), provided as Appendix C.  
 53 
G. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Functional requirements were derived from the functional architecture developed 
for the LAMP. These requirements were then allocated to the specific system elements 
responsible for implementing this functionality. The purpose of the functional 
requirements is to capture the specific criteria that physical solutions for each of the 
subsystems must meet in order for the LAMP as a whole to meet its operational 
requirements and satisfy the capability gaps.  Table 8 lists the functional requirements 
broken out by system element. 
 LAMP Functional Requirements Table 8
Shipboard Weapon System 
Weapon The Weapon shall have a range of 13 nautical miles. 
Delivery System The Delivery System shall have a minimum firing rate of 5 rounds 
per minute. 
Air Detachment 
Air Platform The Air Platform shall operate at least one Air Weapon System and 
at least one Air ISR System. 
The Air Platform shall have a range of at least 100 nautical miles. 
Air Weapon System The Air Weapon System shall have a firing rate of at least five 
rounds per minute. 
Air ISR System The Air ISR System shall locate targets with a target location error 
of 10 meters or less. 
C2 Subsystem 
Fire Control The Fire Control shall be capable of calculating solutions for Air 
Weapon Systems and Shipboard Weapon Systems. 
The Fire Control shall calculate firing solutions to support a firing 
rate of at least five rounds per minute. 
Communications The Communications Subsystem shall support voice and data links 
with at least three Air Platforms. 
The Communications Subsystem shall be capable of at least two 
voice and data links in addition to the Air Platform links. 
Air Asset Control The Air Asset Control shall be capable of controlling and guiding 
three Air Platforms simultaneously. 
Data Processor The Data Processor shall be capable of integrating data from three 
Air Platforms and one Shipboard Weapon Systems. 
Support Subsystem 
Support Distribution System The Support Distribution System shall provide power, water, 
cooling, fuel, ammunition, and networks to the LAMP subsystems. 
Status Monitor The Status Monitor shall simultaneously monitor the health and 
status of the LAMP C2 Subsystem, up to three Air Platforms and 
assorted weapons and ISR subsystems. 
Maintenance System The Maintenance System shall include all support tools for 
operational level preventive and corrective maintenance. 
The Maintenance System shall provide the maintenance actions and 
repairs to achieve a LAMP operational availability of 90%. 
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H. PHYSICAL SOLUTIONS 
With the generic physical architecture established and functional requirements 
allocated to each of the generic system elements, the project considered the currently 
fielded systems that met the requirements allocated to each of those elements. The 
specific instantiation of a generic system element is referred to as an “asset” for the 
remainder of this report. Put another way: assets are selected to fill the role of a system 
element in order to define a specific solution; the combination of assets defines a 
particular LAMP configuration. 
While functional analysis and allocation provided element-level functional 
requirements to use as part of asset consideration, the constraints of the LCS seaframe 
levy non-functional requirements on the system elements that also need to be considered. 
The interface control document for the LCS MPs gave the authors insight into which 
factors should be considered for the candidate system physical solutions. Specifically, the 
areas of interest for the LAMP were size and weight considerations. Clearly, there are a 
significant number of interface and integration issues to consider; however, it appeared 
that size and weight constraints would have the greatest influence over the physical 
architecture. Additionally, these two areas were given more consideration since the 
candidate systems that met the operational and functional requirements of the LAMP 
were similar to systems already fielded on the LCS. Given these similarities, interfaces 
such as power, heating, ventilation, air conditioning, damage control, and data were 
considered lower priority for the study. 
Two LCS module types (weapons and aviation modules) and the weapons 
magazine were considered during the evaluation of physical solutions; all played an 
important role in determining suitable candidates for the LAMP physical architecture. For 
example, weight considerations alone eliminated the 155 mm Advanced Gun System 
from the LAMP. In much the same way (for both size and weight), the Marine Corps CH-
53 helicopter could not be considered as a possible alternative for the LAMP system. Size 
and weight constraints as they apply to candidate solutions are discussed in the following 
sections. 
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1. Shipboard Weapon System 
The shipboard weapon system must engage ground targets from the LCS 
platform. The candidates for the shipboard weapons system are a naval gun or existing 
Army missile system modified for shipboard use. Figure 17 shows the potential 
candidates for an instantiated physical shipboard weapon. 
 
Figure 17 Potential Shipboard Weapons Systems 
The selected systems are intended to consider the range of weapon systems 
available for the LCS platform. The two artillery systems contrast a high-caliber, lower 
firing rate system against a smaller caliber, higher firing rate system. The missile system 
introduces a system with higher single-engagement effectiveness yet lower total number 
of rounds. The following sections further describe the systems considered as potential 
shipboard weapon systems for the LAMP.  
a. MK 75 76 mm Gun 
The MK 75 gun is suitable for installation on small combatants, such as 
LCS, due to its light weight and low manpower requirements. One gun 
mount is installed aboard [United States Navy] frigates and larger USCG 
cutters. The MK 75 was provisionally approved for service use in 
September 1975. BAE Systems (The former Naval Systems Division of 
FMC Corporation) and General Electric Co. (Ordnance Systems Division) 
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were licensed by the gun’s designer, OTO Melara of La Spezia, Italy, and 
competed for the right to manufacture the MK 75 in the United States. In 
1975, BAE systems won the competition. Since 1981, all MK 75 buys 
have been competed between BAE systems and OTO Melara. The U.S. 
Navy is no longer acquiring MK 75 guns but has logistics support 
contracts with BAE systems and OTO Melara. The first MK 75 gun 
produced in the U.S. was delivered in August 1978. The MK 75 gun is in 
the sustainment phase of the product life cycle. System improvements 
include: barrel tube upgrade, breechblock positive stops, and barrel 
cooling panel upgrade. (U.S. Navy 2013) 
 
Although not originally intended as a naval surface fires weapon, the MK 75 76 
mm gun (Figure 18) has the potential to support amphibious forces with extended range 
projectiles. The 21 nautical mile (NM) range of these projectiles exceeds the 13 NM 
requirement of the Joint Fires ICD. The extended range projectiles were designed with 
naval fires support in mind. Additionally, the rapid-fire capability of the MK 75 gives it 
the ability to concentrate considerable amounts of ordnance on target. This capability 
makes the MK 75 a candidate for suppression and volume fires effects as well as being 
effective against hard and soft targets. At approximately 17,000 pounds, the weight of the 
MK 75 and its ammunition stores also appear to be within the weight limits of an LCS 
mission package. 
 
Figure 18 OTO Melara MK 75 76 mm gun (U.S. Navy Photo) 
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b. MK 45 5/62 
The MK 45 five inch gun (Figure 19) is deployed on both Arleigh Burke class 
destroyers and Ticonderoga class cruisers. Its main warfare function is NSFS, but it also 
supports the naval mission areas of surface warfare and air warfare. The MK 45 is ideally 
suited for the NSFS mission. The gun has the ability to support marine amphibious and 
expeditionary forces with conventional and extended range ammunition. This ubiquitous 
gun is one of the most widely used naval guns in the world. Its prevalence helps to make 
it easily supportable and logistically sustainable. “The MK 45 gun was developed as a 
lighter weight, more easily maintained replacement for the MK 42 5/54 caliber gun 
mount. The MK 45 Mod 4 gun mount upgrade includes a longer barrel (62 calibers) that 
improves the gun’s effectiveness as a land attack weapon (naval surface fire support)” 
(U.S. Navy 2013b). “The [MK 45] gun mount includes a 20 round automatic loader 
drum. The gun’s maximum firing rate is 16–20 rounds from the loader drum per minute. 
The rounds in the loader drum can be fired with one crewmember located at the EP-2 
console below deck” (U.S. Navy 2013b). If more rounds are required than the loader can 
supply, then a full gun crew of six personnel is required.    
Given the constraints of the LCS ICD, the weight of the MK 45 gun is too great 
for integration with a LCS weapon system module. The approximately 53,000-pound 
weight of the mount easily exceeds the maximum weight for the LCS weapon type 
module (Miller, Georgiadis, and Laun 2013). Therefore, the MK 45 was removed from 
the candidate solutions list. 
 
Figure 19 MK 45 5/62 Lightweight Gun System (U.S. Navy Photo) 
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c. GMLRS 
The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) is an upgrade to 
the M26 rocket, producing precise destructive and shaped fires against a 
variety of target sets. GMLRS provides close, medium, and long range 
precision and area fires to destroy, suppress and shape threat forces, and to 
protect friendly forces against: cannon, mortar, rocket and missile artillery, 
light material and armor, personnel, command and control, and air defense 
surface targets. GMLRS integrates guidance and control packages and an 
improved rocket motor, achieving greater range and precision accuracy 
than the M26, requiring fewer rockets to defeat targets and thereby 
reducing the logistics burden of the weapon system. The two fielded 
variants are the M30 GMLRS with dual-purpose improved conventional 
munitions (Increment 1) and the M31 GMLRS Unitary (Increment 2) with 
a 200-pound class high explosive warhead equipped with a dual-mode 
fuse (point detonating and delay). The new M31A1 will integrate multi-
mode fuzzing options (proximity, point detonate, and delay), expanding 
the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) target set into urban, 
complex, pre-planned and Troops in Contact scenarios, by delivering a 
low collateral damage, precision-strike rocket. (U.S. Army 2014a) 
 
The M31 GMLRS launch platforms are either the M142 High Mobility Artillery 
Rocket System (HIMARS), shown in Figure 20, or the M270 MLRS. Six M31 missiles 
can be loaded per missile pod.  
The GMLRS family of missiles utilizes inertial guidance that is updated with 
GPS. Given the selection of this candidate shipboard system, the LAMP will use a 
modified HIMARS launch platform for use on the LCS. For the purposes of analysis, the 




Figure 20 GMLRS Rocket (U.S. Army photo) 
At 18,500 pounds GMLRS is within the weight limit to be considered for the 
LAMP. As noted, the LAMP considered the HIMARS vice MLRS for the candidate 
solution. However, it is believed that using an actual HIMARS unit at sea was an 
excessive risk and that a better design solution would consider integrating the launcher-
loader module (LLC) part of the HIMARS (Miller, Georgiadis, and Laun 2013). An 
integrated LLC concept would be similar to the depiction shown in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21 Integrated GLRMS (from Miller, Georgiadis; Laun 2013) 
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d. Relevant Characteristics 
 Table 9 summarizes the salient characteristics of the candidate shipboard 
weapons for the LAMP.   The relevant shipboard weapon system parameters used for 
modeling of the LAMP are: range, probability of success, rate of fire, salvo size, 
magazine capacity, and projectile velocity. All of the parameters used in the modeling 
and simulation of the shipboard weapons systems are, themselves, weapon system 
characteristics that have been referenced from various locations -- with the exception of 
salvo size and probability of success . Salvo size is an assumed value that the authors 
believed were the minimum size necessary to achieve success. With the assumed value of 
salvo size, probability of success was then calculated using the total weight of explosives 
delivered on target.  
 Relevant Shipboard Weapon System Characteristics (after Table 9
Polmar 2005; Graham 2004; Pincoski 2008) 
 













76 mm Gun 21 0.10-0.58 80 8 800 914.4 
GMLRS 
(M31) 
37 0.79-0.91 12 1 12 850.7 
 
2. Air Detachment 
a. Air Platform 
There were, initially, four helicopters that, in conjunction with their weapon 
systems, could ostensibly address the functional requirements allocated to the LAMP air 
platform. In addition to being assessed for functional and technical suitability, each was 
assessed for non-functional requirements as well as Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and Facilities considerations.  
The U.S. Army AH-64 attack helicopter was one of the five helicopters originally 
considered for the project. However, the authors felt that issues of doctrine, organization, 
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training, and logistics were prohibitive factors in including the aircraft in the analysis. 
Given that, the helicopters chosen for inclusion as candidates for the LAMP air platform 
element were the MQ-8B Fire Scout, MH-60R Seahawk, and AH-1Z Viper. 
(1) AH-1Z Viper 
“The AH-1Z attack helicopter provides rotary wing close air support, anti-armor, 
armed escort, armed/visual reconnaissance and fire support coordination capabilities 
under day/night and adverse weather conditions for the USMC. The AH-1Z is equipped 
with an integrated advanced fire control system and the capacity to support multiple 
weapons configurations” (U.S. Navy 2014a). 
The AH-1Z (Figure 22) adds additional capability for the close air support 
mission of the amphibious task force. With its ability to carry a mix of both Hellfire and 
70mm rockets, including an AH-1Z as a LAMP air asset adds significant additional 
firepower to the MEU’s standard compliment of four AH-1Z platforms. Given that, it is 
clear that by deploying an AH-1Z with the LAMP, the MEU air combat element 
increases its attack helicopter capability by twenty-five percent. Further, the use of the 
AH-1Z has the potential to minimize logistics demand on the LAMP and LCS by 
leveraging maintenance support from the embarked MEU air wing. 
 






(2) MH-60R Seahawk 
“The MH-60R Seahawk missions are ASW, Anti-Surface Warfare, Surveillance, 
Communications Relay, Combat Search and Rescue, Naval Gunfire Support and logistics 
support. [ASW] and [SUW] are the MH-60R’s primary missions. Secondary missions 
include Search and Rescue, Vertical Replenishment, [NSFS], logistics support, personnel 
transport, Medical Evacuation, and Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency/Link 
Communication Relay” (U.S. Navy 2014b). The MH-60R (Figure 23) is also equipped 
with the AN/APS-153 radar. This multifunction Synthetic Aperture and Inverse Synthetic 
Aperture Radar is ideally suited for the LAMP ISR functionality. The radar can detect, 
image, identify, and track targets at a safe standoff distance for the aircrew. The MH-60R 
also has an EO/IR targeting system that gives the helicopter the capability to execute 
engagements with both the Hellfire missiles and Advanced Precision Kill Weapon 
System (APKWS) rockets. ISR systems and missiles are addressed in more detail in 
Section C. 
 
Figure 23 MH-60R Seahawk Helicopter (U.S. Navy Photo) 
(3) MQ-8B 
According to the U.S. Navy, “the Fire Scout [VTUAV] system is comprised of up 
to three MQ-8B Fire Scout air vehicles, ground control stations, and associated control 
handling and support equipment. With vehicle endurance greater than eight hours, a 
VTUAV system will be capable of twelve continuous hours of operations providing 
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coverage 110 nautical miles from the launch site,” (U.S. Navy 2014c). The MQ-8B 
(Figure 24) includes persistent long-range radar surveillance, EO/IR targeting, and 
APKWS missiles with the platform. The MQ-8B is well suited to add ISR capability to 
the LAMP with its AN/ZPY-4 radar and its BriteStar II EO/IR system. 
 
Figure 24 MQ-8B Fire Scout (U.S. Navy Photo) 
(4) Relevant Characteristics 
In order to adequately characterize the air platforms’ contribution to the LAMP 
ability to perform fire support, the maximum available missile carrying capacity of each 
air platform was essential to meeting overall mission success parameters. The initial 
approach considered maximizing firepower and lethality of both aviation assets and 
shipboard weapons for the mission package. Additionally, since all of the helicopters are 
Navy aircraft, supportability and maintainability are greatly enhanced.  Table 10 







 Relevant Air Platform Characteristics (after U.S. Navy Table 10
2014a, Sikorsky 2014, and U.S. Navy 2014c) 
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MQ-8B Fire 
Scout 
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b. Air Weapon System 
(1) Hellfire 
“Hellfire is an air-to-ground, laser guided, subsonic missile with significant 
antitank capacity. It can also be used as an air-to-air weapon against helicopters or slow-
moving fixed-wing aircraft.  […] The AGM-114 provides precision striking power 
against tanks, structures, bunkers and helicopters. The Hellfire missile is capable of 
defeating any known tank in the world today. It can be guided to the target either from 
inside the aircraft or by lasers outside the aircraft” (U.S. Navy 2009). The Hellfire is 
qualified for use on several helicopters in the U.S. inventory including the MH-60R and 
the AH-1Z, and has been demonstrated but not fielded on the MQ-8B (U.S. Navy 2009). 
(2) APKWS 
APKWS is a laser-guided rocket based on the Hydra 70 family of 2.75-inch 
rockets (U.S. Navy 2012). The APKWS is produced by adding a kit that turns the 
unguided rocket into an extremely accurate and effective missile (U.S. Navy 2012). 
Because it is an add-on kit, the APKWS is cost effective and easily integrated into the 
large inventory of aircraft already qualified to use hydra 70 rockets (U.S. Navy 2012). 
The APKWS is qualified on all of the aircraft under consideration for the LAMP 
including the unmanned MQ-8B (U.S. Navy 2012). The missile’s probability of success, 
along with the Hellfire’s, is shown in Table 11. 
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 Relevant Missile Characteristics (after Jacobson 2010) Table 11
 
Missile Range (NM) Rate of Fire (rounds per minute) 
Probability of 
Success 
Hellfire 4.3 8-18 0.63-0.72 
APKWS 2.7 8-20 0.47-0.56 
 
Even with the candidate helicopters already under consideration, the air-to-ground 
missile selection was, as previously noted, somewhat of a bottom-up evolution. Since 
fires were a prime consideration for the LAMP, missile selection was extremely 
important. According to the Naval Aviation Vision 2010 (U.S. Navy 2009) the available 
missiles for the candidate helicopters noted above are the Hellfire, APKWS, and Low-
Cost Guided Imaging Rocket (LOGIR). Given the similar performance characteristics of 
the LOGIR and APKWS missiles, the LOGIR is not considered in this report. Since both 
missiles use the identical base rocket system (Hydra 70) their effective range, accuracy, 
and firepower are considered similar enough that, for the purposes of the LAMP 
evaluation, only one of the two missiles was necessary for evaluation. APKWS was 
chosen due to its being qualified for use on the AH-1Z and its planned qualification on 
the MH-60R.  
With potential candidates for the aviation fires support selected, a potential set of 
architectures for modeling would resemble that shown in Figure 25. The feasible LAMP 
configurations, discussed in the following chapter, address the various combinations of 
the three helicopters feasible for deployment as an overall LAMP air detachment.  
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Figure 25 Potential Air-to-Ground Systems 
c. Air ISR&T System 
The two classes of systems that are critical with respect to the LAMP aviation 
assets for the air ISR&T systems are the targeting designation systems and the search 
radars. All of the helicopters chosen had EO/IR/Targeting Systems and two of the three 
(AH-1Z and MQ-8B) have surface search radars.  
It is important to note that shipboard sensor systems were not considered by this 
analysis due to the projected distance of the LCS platform to the AOR (20 nautical miles) 
and the assumed inability of shipboard sensor systems to detect threats over the horizon.  
(1) AN/AAS-44C(V)1 EO/IR/Targeting System 
The AN/AAS-44C(V)1 is a forward looking infrared (FLIR) system installed on 
the MH-60R helicopter. In addition to FLIR, the AN/AAS-44C(V)1  also provides long-
range detection of targets in the visible spectrum with its electro-optic sensor capability. 
The AN/AAS-44C(V)1 also includes laser designation and illumination, and range 
detecting capabilities allowing the MH-60 to detect, track, and engage hostile targets. “It 
features multiple fields of view, electronic zoom and multimode video tracking and was 
designed to incorporate future growth options and performance enhancements” 
(Raytheon 2014a). The AN/AAS-44C(V)1’s laser designation, range finding and 
targeting capabilities support both the Hellfire and APKWS missiles.  
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In analyzing the LAMP, one of the modeling and simulation input parameters 
used for determining the systems ISR effectiveness was radius of sensor detection range. 
Since actual EO/IR system detection ranges are classified, the authors chose to use the 
range given for a similar FLIR system, the AN/ASQ-228 Advanced Targeting FLIR, to 
model detection range for the AN/AAS-44C(V)1. The authors believe that the advertised 
40 NM range for the AN/ASQ-228 is a reasonable estimate for the purposes of modeling 
the LAMP system while keeping the study unclassified. A close-up of the AN/AAS-
44C(V)1 is shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26 AN/AAS-44C(V) (U.S. Navy Photo) 
(2) AN/APS-153 Radar 
The AN/APS-153(V) provides the MH-60R and its host ship littoral and 
maritime domain awareness. Radar operators can classify detected moving 
ship targets under night and restricted visibility using the high-resolution 
Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) mode. This mode allows the 
MH-60R to operate outside of visual and lethal range of a potential enemy 
and to identify detected targets when images are combined with other 
intelligence. The MH-60R, combined with the AN/APS-153(V), is 
designed to operate from helo-capable small combatants to the largest 
aircraft carriers as a key element in the helicopter-ship system. Via the 
aircraft’s C-band data link, shipboard personnel have virtually the same 
radar picture as the flight crew. The radar will withstand the harshest 
maritime and helo vibration environments. (Telephonics n.d.a, 1–2) 
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Some of the modes of operation are ISAR imaging, synthetic aperture radar 
(SAR) imaging, navigation, and small target detection. SAR imaging can aid in target 
identification. The photograph in Figure 27 is a SAR image of hangars at Kirtland air 
force base with a one-meter resolution. 
 
Figure 27 SAR Image (from Sandia National Laboratory) 
(3) AN/AAQ-30 TSS EO/IR/Targeting System 
[Target Sight System (TSS)] is the multi-sensor [EO/IR] fire control 
system (AN/AAQ-30) for the U.S. Marine Corps AH-1Z Viper attack 
helicopter. It is a large-aperture midwave [FLIR] sensor, color TV, laser 
designator/rangefinder (with eyesafe mode), and on-gimbal inertial 
measurement unit integrated into a highly stabilized turret. The turret 
mounts to the nose of the aircraft via the Lockheed Martin-developed 
aircraft interface structure. TSS provides the capability to identify and 
laser-designate targets at maximum weapon range, significantly enhancing 
platform survivability and lethality. (Lockheed Martin 2014) 
For the same reasons as the AN/AAS-44C(V)1 mentioned above, the authors 
believe that the 40 NM range (Lockheed Martin 2014) is a reasonable estimate for the 
purposes of modeling the LAMP system while keeping the study unclassified. The TSS 
laser targeting capabilities are compatible with both the Hellfire and APKWS missiles. A 
close up of the TSS is shown in Figure 28. 
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Figure 28 AN/AAQ-30 (U.S. Navy Photo) 
(4) AN/ZPY-4(V)1 Radar 
The AN/ZPY-4(V)1 (Telephonics model RDR-1700B, hardware shown in Figure 
29) is a long range surface search and surveillance radar that can track up to 200 targets 
and can also image tracks when in either the SAR or ISAR modes. The RDR-1700B 
provides three modes for target imaging, including ISAR, strip-map, and spotlight SAR, 
which provide high-resolution images of targets or terrain (Telephonics n.d.b). The radar 
is also a weather avoidance radar. The RDR-1700B can detect targets down to one square 
meter with a maximum radar range of 120 NM. 
 
Figure 29 AN/ZPY-4(V)1 Radar (from Telephonics n.d.b) 
(5) AN/AAQ-22E EO/IR and Laser Designator 
FLIR Systems Incorporated builds the AN/AAQ-22E EO/IR and Laser 
Designator system. The unit has the same functionality as the AAS-44C and the TSS, in 
that all three are long-range targeting and designation systems. FLIR Systems uses the 
AN/AAQ-22E as the BRITE Star II. The unit is fielded on the MQ-8B, the U.S. Marine 
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Corps UH-1, the Bradley fighting vehicle, and Norwegian Navy patrol boats (FLIR 
Systems, Inc. n.d., 1). The AN/AAQ-22E’s high-resolution thermal imagery, laser range 
finder, and laser designator capabilities are well suited for the proposed LAMP mission. 
As with the AAS-44C and the TSS, it is compatible with Hellfire and APKWS. A close 
up of the AN/AAQ-22E is shown in Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30 AN/AAQ-22E (U.S. Navy Photo) 
Table 12 summarizes the relevant characteristics of the various LAMP air assets 
with respect to ISR&T data collection.  
 Relevant Air ISR&T Asset Characteristics (after Raytheon Table 12
2014b) 
 
Aircraft Detection Range (NM) 
AH-1Z Viper 40 
MH-60R Seahawk 123 
MQ-8B Fire Scout 137.5 
 
d. Overall LAMP Configuration 
With the potential LAMP shipboard weapon systems and air assets identified, the 
analysis focused on defining those LAMP configurations that conform to the MP 
requirements identified in the LCS MP interface control document. LAMP (and 
individual asset) characteristics such as weight, size, and quantity were used to define the 
following LAMP characteristics: 
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• Quantity of shipboard weapon system ammunition 
• Feasible air detachment configurations 
• Quantity of missiles available for air asset reload 
The quantity of ammunition available for the MK 75 76 mm gun was estimated 
based on an assumption that two weapon system modules of the LAMP are reserved as a 
magazine for the necessary ammunition. The 7,500 kilogram weight limit of each weapon 
system module, as documented in the LCS MP interface control document, contributes to 
an estimate of 800 rounds of ammunition available for MK 75 engagements. The quantity 
of rounds available to the GMLRS asset is estimated at 12 (Miller, Georgiadis and Laun 
2013). 
Feasible LAMP air detachment configurations have been assumed to include only 
those air detachments that are made up of the same type of air platform, due to a desire to 
minimize the logistics tail associated with a given LAMP configuration. Further, and for 
the same reason, feasible LAMP air detachment configurations are assumed to only 
include those air detachments that utilize a single missile type. 
It is important to note that the LCS MP interface control document states that the 
LCS supports only a single manned air asset (i.e., only a single MH-60R or AH-1Z), but 
up to three unmanned air assets (i.e., MQ-8Bs). This requirement further limits the 
feasible LAMP air detachment configurations to those detachments with only a single 
manned air asset. However, during Rim of the Pacific Exercise 2014 the USS 
Independence (LCS 2) supported the use of two MH-60S helicopters, suggesting the 
potential for operations of two manned aviation assets aboard the LCS platform (Jones 
2014). As a result, this project addresses LAMP air detachments that include up to two 
MH-60R or two AH-1Z air assets; final recommendations of the project, presented in 
Chapter V, further describe this discrepancy. 
The quantity of missiles available for reloading potential air assets was, similarly, 
based on data from the LCS MP interface control document as well as size and weight 
estimates of the Hellfire and APKWS missiles. LCS MP interface control document data 
was used to estimate that the LCS magazine supports up to 77 Hellfire missiles, all of 
which would be available to LAMP air detachment. Physical size and weight 
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characteristics of the Hellfire and APKWS were used to estimate that three APKWS 
missiles take up the weight of a single Hellfire, while the volume of an APKWS missile 
is less than a quarter of the volume of a Hellfire missile. As a result, the LCS magazine is 
(conservatively) assumed to support 231 APKWS missiles; again, all of these missiles are 
assumed to be available to a given LAMP air detachment. 
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IV. MODELING AND EVALUATION 
In order to evaluate the various LAMP configurations identified through 
functional analysis and allocation, the project developed back of the envelope (BOE) and 
discrete-event models to assess each configuration’s ability to meet the MOEs defined by 
the LAMP DRM. In addition, the project estimated the life-cycle cost of each LAMP 
configuration in support of identifying the most cost-effective LAMP for employing fires 
and performing ISR&T data collection in support of amphibious operations. This chapter 
presents the models developed by the project as well as the cost breakdown structure and 
cost data used to develop life-cycle cost estimates (LCCEs) of the LAMP configurations. 
The following chapter synthesizes the resultant data in an analysis of alternatives.  
A. MODEL FACTORS AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
There are many factors that influence the effectiveness of an attacking formation 
against its target. Elements such as weather conditions and parameters of the defending 
force are not under our control in real-life situations. However, other battle parameters, 
such as weapon system capabilities and the make-up of deployed formations, are under 
our control for future deployments. These factors can be varied in a model of a battle to 
determine the effect the changes have on the deployed formation’s effectiveness. 
In order to compare the various LAMP alternatives equivalently, it was necessary 
to define each MP by a common set of variables (to compare “apples to apples”). The 
factors used to describe the various LAMP configurations were derived from the LAMP 
physical architecture; Table 13 defines the basic factors and factor levels used to describe 






 LAMP Alternative Factor Levels Table 13
 
Factor 
Level Helo1 Helo2 Helo3 
Shipboard 
Weapon System 


















4 AH-1Z w/Hellfire AH-1Z w/Hellfire - - 
5 AH-1Z w/APKWS AH-1Z w/APKWS - - 
 
As discussed in Chapter III, however, not all permutations of the factors captured 
in Table 13 represent feasible configurations for deployment aboard the LCS seaframe. In 
short, the feasible air detachment configurations include those configurations with only a 
single asset type. For example, a given LAMP configuration may only include MH-60R 
air assets equipped with a single missile type in order to decrease the logistics tail 
associated with the air detachment. As a result, the air detachment configurations 
evaluated in this report are limited to those presented in Table 14.   
 Evaluated LAMP Air Detachment Configurations Table 14
 
AirDetachment Helo1 Helo2 Helo3 
0 None None None 
1 MQ-8B None None 
2 MH-60R w/Hellfire None None 
3 MH-60R w/APKWS None None 
4 AH-1Z w/Hellfire None None 
5 AH-1Z w/APKWS None None 
6 MQ-8B w/APKWS MQ-8B w/APKWS None 
7 MH-60R w/Hellfire MH-60R w/Hellfire None 
8 MH-60R w/APKWS MH-60R w/APKWS None 
9 AH-1Z w/Hellfire AH-1Z w/Hellfire None 
10 AH-1Z w/APKWS AH-1Z w/APKWS None 
11 MQ-8B w/APKWS MQ-8B w/APKWS MQ-8B w/APKWS 
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Finally, the identified LAMP air detachment configurations and potential 
shipboard weapon systems were used to define the LAMP configurations evaluated for 
mission effectiveness. The 36 evaluated LAMP configurations are provided in Table 15. 
 Evaluated LAMP Configurations Table 15
 
LAMP Configuration Air Detachment Shipboard Weapon System 
0 None None 
1 None 76 mm Gun 
2 None GMLRS 
3 (1) MQ-8B w/APKWS None 
4 (1) MQ-8B w/APKWS 76 mm Gun 
5 (1) MQ-8B w/APKWS GMLRS 
6 (1) MH-60 w/Hellfire None 
7 (1) MH-60 w/Hellfire 76 mm Gun 
8 (1) MH-60 w/Hellfire GMLRS 
9 (1) MH-60 w/APKWS None 
10 (1) MH-60 w/APKWS 76 mm Gun 
11 (1) MH-60 w/APKWS GMLRS 
12 (1) AH-1Z w/Hellfire None 
13 (1) AH-1Z w/Hellfire 76 mm Gun 
14 (1) AH-1Z w/Hellfire GMLRS 
15 (1) AH-1Z w/APKWS None 
16 (1) AH-1Z w/APKWS 76 mm Gun 
17 (1) AH-1Z w/APKWS GMLRS 
18 (2) MQ-8B w/APKWS None 
19 (2) MQ-8B w/APKWS 76 mm Gun 
20 (2) MQ-8B w/APKWS GMLRS 
21 (2) MH-60 w/Hellfire None 
22 (2) MH-60 w/Hellfire 76 mm Gun 
23 (2) MH-60 w/Hellfire GMLRS 
24 (2) MH-60 w/APKWS None 
25 (2) MH-60 w/APKWS 76 mm Gun 
26 (2) MH-60 w/APKWS GMLRS 
27 (2) AH-1Z w/Hellfire None 
28 (2) AH-1Z w/Hellfire 76 mm Gun 
29 (2) AH-1Z w/Hellfire GMLRS 
30 (2) AH-1Z w/APKWS None 
31 (2) AH-1Z w/APKWS 76 mm Gun 
32 (2) AH-1Z w/APKWS GMLRS 
33 (3) MQ-8B w/APKWS None 
34 (3) MQ-8B w/APKWS 76 mm Gun 
35 (3) MQ-8B w/APKWS GMLRS 
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B. MODEL ARCHITECTURE AND LOGIC 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of each possible LAMP configuration, 
models were created to represent the OPSIT described by the LAMP DRM. The first 
aspect of the OPSIT deals with the battlefield recognition and identification of enemy 
forces. The second aspect of the OPSIT deals with the engagement of targets and the 
effectiveness of a given configuration against an enemy force. Complete evaluation of 
potential solutions required modeling and simulation of both aspects of the OPSIT. 
The model developed for this project does not consider elements such as weather 
conditions, the ability of the enemy to return fire, nor, in turn, the survivability of the 
given friendly force assets. The model focuses on providing a means to gauge the best 
combination of assets in a MP in terms of how effective those combinations are against a 
prescribed enemy force. The model addresses the specific MOEs defined as part of the 
DRM.  
Two separate models were constructed to analyze the OPSIT described in the 
DRM—one to consider the ability of a LAMP configuration at collecting ISR&T data, 
and one to evaluate the effectiveness of a configuration at providing fire support. Both 
situations were considered through a BOE method (using Microsoft Excel) for quick, 
rough analyses as well as a discrete-event model (using ExtendSim) to more fully 
evaluate the effectiveness of alternative LAMP configurations. Screenshots of the 
discrete-event models are provided in Appendix D. 
1. ISR&T Model 
The ISR&T model assumes an initial threat density within the AOR. The threat 
density is calculated from the initial number of threats occupying the AOR (5,000 threats) 
and the square mileage of the AOR (10,000 square nautical miles), as defined by the 
DRM. With initial AOR conditions established, the BOE model relies upon the 
assumption that air assets travel at a constant speed during ISR&T operations with a 
circular area of ISR&T coverage. As the asset travels over the AOR, the coverage area 
associated with the air asset increases the percent of the AOR covered by the air asset’s 
sensor over the course of the mission. With a defined probability of detection, the model 
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considers the ability of the air asset to detect threats throughout the AOR over time (i.e., 
as the coverage area of the air asset moves throughout the AOR). 
The ISR&T BOE model calculates the percentage of threats detected over time in 
order to understand the distribution of this output over time.  Figure 31 provides the 
general distribution of the percentage of threats detected over time for a single air asset, 
depicting a higher rate of detection early in the mission (due to the higher threat density 
existing within the AOR) and an asymptotic approach of the total number of threats. The 
rate of threat detection decreases due to the decrease in the number of threats and the 
associated decrease in the threat density within the AOR; the time between detections 
increases as the number of threats within a defined area decreases.  
  
 
Figure 31 BOE Estimation of Percentage of Threats Detected over 
Time for Representative LAMP Configuration 
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The ISR&T discrete-event model builds on the logic established in the BOE 
model. The ISR&T discrete-event model creates a pool of initial threats based on the 
initial conditions used in the BOE model and described in the DRM. The discrete-event 
model then considers the coverage of up to three air assets (depending on the evaluated 
LAMP configuration) in support of identifying those targets during the mission. The 
logic associated with the ISR&T discrete-event model is depicted in Figure 32 and 
further explained in Table 16.   
 




 ISR&T Discrete-Event Model Functional Description Table 16
 
Step Step Name Description 
1 Create Threats This function creates the items that represent each individual 
target 
2 Assets Available This action selects amongst available assets and assigns an area 
of operations. This action mimics the C2 component of the 
model 
3 Movement Assets travel from the LCS to the area of operations and 
perform a scan of the area involving steps 3a and 3b. 
3a Within Coverage Assets have a radius of detection based on operational altitude.  
3b Within Range The endurance of the asset is based on its flight range 
4 Identify The targets are identified based on a probability of detection 
 
The ISR&T discrete-event model, based on the mission and asset parameters 
discussed, provides effectiveness data for a given LAMP configuration in terms of the 
percentage of targets identified during a four-hour mission. Chapter V discusses the 
effectiveness of specific LAMP configurations in terms of the percentage of targets 
detected during an ISR&T data collection mission. 
2. Shooter Model 
Whereas the ISR&T model relies upon an initial number of threats, the shooter 
model is based upon the receipt of fire missions over time. This report assumes that the 
LAMP receives fire missions at a rate of one mission every fifteen minutes as a Poisson 
distribution, and that the overall fire support mission lasts for a duration of four hours. 
The BOE shooter model considered two parameters of a given weapon system, 
including the rate of fire and the probability of successfully affecting a given target. 
These parameters were used to evaluate the percentage of targets successfully affected by 
the weapon system.  Figure 33 depicts the generic output of the BOE model in terms of 
the percentage of targets successfully affected by a representative weapon system. As 
shown, the percentage of targets successfully affected by a weapon system, in terms of 
the fire missions received, eventually normalizes around a steady-state value. This 
steady-state value is ultimately defined by the rate of fire missions received by the 
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system, the rate of fire of the system, and the probability of successfully affected a target 
with single engagement. 
 
Figure 33 BOE Estimation of Percentage of Successful Fire Missions 
Associated with a Representative LAMP Configuration 
The discrete-event shooter model adds additional complexity to the BOE model 
by considering the effects of utilizing the air assets as additional engagement platforms. 
Whereas the discrete-event model relies upon the logic of the BOE model to represent 
shipboard weapon systems, the air asset engagement sequence was modeled to account 
for the movement of a given air asset throughout the AOR and other characteristics 
unique to air asset engagement.  Figure 34 depicts the logic associated with the discrete-




Figure 34 Shooter Discrete-Event Model Block Diagram 
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 ExtendSim Shooter Model Functional Description Table 17
 
Step Step Name Description 
1 Create Threats This function creates the items that represent each individual target 
2 Assets Selection This action selects amongst available assets based on 
ammunition and range. This section of the model acts as the 
C2 component of the model 
2a Ammo Ammunition on hand is checked 
2b Range The target must be within the range of engagement, if not then 
the target is passed to another asset 
3 Reload A time delay is entered here to account for loading of 
ammunition and refueling time for air assets. 
4 Movement Air assets only, this is the time it takes the air asset to travel to 
and from the LCS in order to reload ammunition 
5 Engage Action of shooting the target and the ballistic time it takes to 
hit the target 
6 Hit Probability of the round of hitting the target. This accounts for 
both the weapon accuracy and the probability of kill of the 
ammunition. 
 
C. CONFIGURATION EFFECTIVENESS 
The three dependent variables (responses) measured through simulation were 
percentage of targets detected, average engagement time, and percentage of targets 
successfully affected (i.e., the three MOEs first presented in Chapter II). The independent 
variables manipulated by this project were the shipboard weapon system (“Shipboard 
Weapon”) and the LAMP air detachment configuration (“Air Detachment”). The 
combination of a single Shipboard Weapon and a single Air Detachment defined a single 
LAMP configuration. Constraints and limitations of a LCS MP, as discussed in Chapters 
III and IV, result in a possible 36 LAMP configurations.  
It is important to restate a LCS limitation first presented in Chapter III: per the 
LCS MP interface control document, the LCS air detachment is limited to not more than 
a single manned air asset. As a result, LAMP configurations 21 through 32 are not 
considered feasible alternatives. However, the LCS has operated with two manned air 
assets during recent naval exercises such as “Rim of the Pacific 2014” (Jones 2014). As a 
result, this report considers the effectiveness of these LAMP configurations. The 
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remainder of this chapter distinguishes between “feasible” and “infeasible” LAMP air 
detachment configurations; feasible configurations are considered for ultimate 
recommendations of this project; infeasible configurations are discussed for consideration 
in future work. 
In order to identify statistically significant differences between the mean MOE 
values of each evaluated LAMP configuration, the models of each configuration were 
subjected to 500 simulation runs. The resultant simulation data was analyzed to identify 
the interval of the mean MOE value for each configuration (for each MOE) with a 95% 
confidence level. These confidence levels were then evaluated using Tukey’s honest 
significant difference (HSD) multiple comparison tests in order to identify those 
configurations with statistically different mean MOE values. These results were then used 
to identify the most effective configurations for each of the three MOEs. The following 
sections further describe the results of each MOE analysis. 
1. Percent Detected 
The data associated with the 500 samples for each LAMP configuration were used 
to calculate a confidence interval for each configuration’s ability to detect threats (as a 
percentage of total threats). As discussed in the physical solutions section of Chapter III, 
the shipboard weapon has no impact on the percentage of threats detected by a given 
LAMP configuration. As a result, Figure 35 depicts the percentage of threats detected for 
each air detachment with no distinction of the associated shipboard weapon; the 
shipboard weapon associated with a given air detachment does not impact the LAMP’s 




Figure 35 Percent Detected vs. Air Detachment Configuration 
The mean percent detected of each configuration was assigned a 95% confidence 
interval in order to identify those configurations with statistically significant differences 
in percentage of threats detected. As discussed above, this analysis was performed using 
Tukey’s HSD multiple comparison tests.   
The results of the means analysis and multiple comparison test indicate that, of 
the feasible air detachment configurations, a LAMP air detachment of two or three MQ-
8Bs would be the most effective at detecting threats (with an average percentage of 
threats detected of 100%). The second most effective feasible configurations consist of 
either a single MQ-8B or a single MH-60R at 70% of threats successfully detected. The 
AH-1Z provides the least effectiveness in detecting threats with a mean value of 59%. 
The ability to deploy two manned air platforms as a LAMP air detachment would 
not have a statistically significant impact on the percentage of threats detected; two MH-


























Air Detachment Configuration 
 86 
2. Engagement Time 
The data associated with the 500 samples for each LAMP configuration were also 
used to calculate a confidence interval for each configuration’s average engagement time. 
Figure 36 depicts the engagement time (in minutes) for each shipboard weapon system 
and air detachment configuration. Each line on the graph represents a potential shipboard 
weapon, while potential air detachment configurations are captured along the x-axis of 
the graph. 
 
Figure 36 Engagement Time vs. Air Detachment Configuration for 
each Shipboard Weapon 
The different lines in Figure 36 represents different shipboard weapon systems, 
with each location along the x-axis representing a particular air detachment configuration. 
The figure provides a single graphic of the effectiveness of each LAMP configuration in 
terms of average engagement time. The relatively high average engagement time of the 
“none” line indicates that LAMP configurations without a shipboard weapon system have 


























systems. The varying levels of the red and green lines, representing the configurations 
with a 76 mm gun and GMLRS, respectively, suggest that there may not be a significant 
difference between the two weapon systems in terms of average engagement time.  
The mean engagement time of each configuration was assigned a 95% confidence 
interval in order to identify those configurations with statistically significant differences 
in average engagement times. As discussed above, this analysis was performed using 
Tukey’s HSD multiple comparison tests.  
The results of the means analysis and multiple comparison tests indicate that, of 
the currently feasible LAMP configurations, the LAMP configuration with a GMLRS and 
no air detachment provides the shortest engagement time at 0.2 minutes. The second most 
effective feasible configuration consists of a 76 mm gun and no air detachment, with an 
average engagement time of 1.2 minutes. The third most effective feasible LAMP 
configuration, in terms of average engagement time, consists of a 76mm gun and a MH-
60R outfitted with Hellfire missiles at 2.3 minutes. These configurations, as well as the 
remainder of the top five most effective feasible configurations, are presented in Table 
18. 
 Top Five Most Effective Feasible LAMP Configurations in Table 18





Weapon Air Detachment 
Average Engagement 
Time (minutes) (95% 
CI) 
Rank 
7 76mm  (1) MH-60 w/Hellfire 2.30 ± 0.05 1st 
4 76mm (1) MQ-8B w/APKWS 2.82 ± 0.09 2nd 
8 GMLRS (1) MH-60 w/Hellfire 2.85 ± 0.06 2nd 
13 76mm (1) AH-1Z w/Hellfire 3.62 ± 0.08 3rd 
14 GMLRS (1) AH-1Z w/Hellfire 3.71 ± 0.09 4th 
 
 
The ability to deploy two manned aerial assets as part of the LAMP air 
detachment does not increase the effectiveness of the LAMP in terms of average 
engagement time. LAMP configurations with two manned aerial assets and either the 
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76mm gun or the GMLRS have an average engagement time that is statistically higher 
(i.e., worse) than the configurations listed in Table 18. 
3. Percent Affected 
The data associated with the 500 samples for each LAMP configuration were also 
used to calculate a confidence interval for each configuration’s average percentage of 
threats successfully affected. Figure 37 depicts the average percent of threats affected for 
each shipboard weapon system and air detachment configuration. Each line on the graph 
represents a potential shipboard weapon, while potential air detachment configurations 
are captured along the x-axis of the graph. 
  
Figure 37 Percent Affected vs. Air Detachment Configuration for 































The different lines in Figure 37 represent different shipboard weapon system, with 
each location along the x-axis representing a particular air detachment configuration. The 
figure provides a single graphic of the effectiveness of each LAMP configuration in 
terms of percentage of targets successfully affected. The relatively low average 
percentage of targets affected by the “none” configurations suggest that no shipboard 
weapon system is less effective than those LAMP configurations with a 76 mm gun or a 
GMLRS shipboard weapon system (represented by the red and green lines, respectively). 
The mean percentage of threats affected for each configuration was assigned a 
95% confidence interval in order to identify those configurations with statistically 
significant differences in average percent affected. As discussed above, this analysis was 
performed using Tukey’s HSD multiple comparison tests.  
The results of the means analysis and multiple comparison test indicate that, of 
the currently feasible LAMP configurations, a range of LAMP configurations are 
statistically equivalent in terms of their effectiveness at affecting targets. One interesting 
data point associated with the configurations most effective at affecting targets is that six 
of the top seven configurations employ air detachments with the APKWS. The top seven 
LAMP configurations, in terms of percentage of targets engaged, are presented in Table 
19; all of the top seven configurations are statistically equivalent at meeting the MOE. 
 Most Effective Feasible LAMP Configurations in Terms of Table 19





Weapon Air Detachment 
Average Percent 
Affected (95% CI) Rank 
11 GMLRS (1) MH-60 w/APKWS 0.983 ± 0.002 1st 
14 GMLRS (1) AH-1Z w/Hellfire 0.981 ± 0.003 1st 
17 GMLRS (1) AH-1Z w/APKWS 0.981 ± 0.002 1st 
35 GMLRS (3) MQ-8B w/APKWS 0.978 ± 0.003 1st 
10 76mm (1) MH-60 w/APKWS 0.975 ± 0.003 1st 
16 76mm (1) AH-1Z w/APKWS 0.973 ± 0.003 1st 




The ability to deploy two manned aerial assets as part of the LAMP air 
detachment would not significantly impact the LAMP effectiveness in terms of 
successfully affecting targets. This result is based on the high effectiveness of the LAMP 
configurations with a single manned aviation asset in terms of affecting targets; adding an 
additional manned asset to the configuration does not statistically increase the 
effectiveness of the configuration at successfully affecting targets. 
 
D. COST ESTIMATION 
Cost estimation is a necessary step in identifying the most cost-effective solution 
at meeting a given objective. The total cost for acquisition and ownership of each 
potential LAMP configuration over its useful life was estimated in order to develop life-
cycle cost estimates for each configuration in support of identifying the most cost-
effective LAMP configuration at providing fires employment and ISR&T data collection 
in support of amphibious operations. The useful life for the LAMP was assumed to be 
equal to the service life of the LCS, which is 25 years (U.S. DOD 2012). 
For this analysis, the life-cycle costs (LCCs) of alternative solutions were 
estimated in order to understand the total cost of a system over its lifetime, rather than 
just the initial cost to procure it. The analysis generated LCCEs that include the costs 
associated with research, development, procurement, and installation of the system, as 
well as the manpower needed to operate the system, the personnel and equipment 
necessary to maintain the system, and the personnel and equipment necessary to meet the 
training requirements associated with the system. These categories are described in 
greater detail below: 
• Research and Development (R&D): This category includes the cost of all 
research and development, from program initiation through the Full Rate 
Production  
• Procurement: This is the cost to purchase the system from a vendor. 
• Operation and support (O&S): The bulk of life-cycle costs occur during 
this category. It covers the cost of operating and supporting the fielded 
system. O&S includes personnel requirements, maintenance, training, the 
cost to replenish spares, ammunition costs and fuel costs to operate the 
aerial assets over a 25 year life cycle.  
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 A cost breakdown structure (CBS) was created to display the cost contributors of 
the LAMP in a graphical depiction. Figure 38 displays a general CBS for the potential 
solutions; the costs of each element in the CBS for each asset associated with a given 
LAMP configuration are summed in order to calculate the LCCE of each potential LAMP 
configuration. Each potential solution is slightly different, for example: the MK 75 76 
mm gun maintenance is only performed at the intermediate and depot level, while other 
systems have maintenance at the organizational, intermediate and organization levels. 
This analysis considered alternatives with no shipboard weapon system or no air 
detachments, so the initial ammunition load-out is estimated separately for air weapons 
and shipboard weapons. 
 
Figure 38 LAMP Cost Breakdown Structure 
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1. Research and Development 
For this analysis, all of the assets considered in the potential solutions are existing 
systems that have already been deployed for military use. Therefore, it is assumed the 
only research and development costs associated with the LCC of the potential solutions 
proposed is the cost to integrate the existing systems onto an LCS and to verify the results 
of that integration effort. The cost estimate for the R&D required to integrate existing 
systems was estimated based upon existing LCS mission module integration efforts, 
specifically the gun mission module R&D costs of $6.36M (U.S. Navy 2014e). Aerial 
assets are already deployed aboard LCS and are therefore assumed to not impact the 
R&D cost estimate for a given LAMP configuration. Similarly, because the evaluated air 
asset weapons are already deployed on the considered air assets, the air asset weapon 
associated with a given configuration does not impact the estimated R&D costs. 
2. Procurement 
The procurement cost of each potential asset was determined based on the DOD’s 
current and past fiscal year (FY) budgets for the Navy or Army (as appropriate for the 
given asset) to determine the overall procurement cost of each configuration and the 
initial outfitting of ammunition for each. In this evaluation, it has been assumed that each 
aerial asset is procured with a quantity of one full load-out of munitions to be initially 
outfitted aboard each asset within a configuration. The C2 for the systems, as well as the 
logistics support, were considered part of the procurement costs of each system based on 
the procurement breakdown in the budget data. Past FY data was converted to current FY 
dollars to provide an accurate comparison of each solution. This conversion calculation 
was based on the Naval Center for Cost Analysis Joint Inflation Calculator. This source 
uses an inflation factor to determine the current FY cost based on the then-year cost.  
As discussed previously, it has been estimated that an LCS is capable of storing 
77 Hellfire missiles or 231 APKWS rockets. For the air platforms containing APKWS, 
this equates to 38 reloads for the configurations utilizing the MQ-8B, six reloads for the 
configurations utilizing the MH-60R, or three reloads for the configurations utilizing the 
AH-1Z. For the air platforms containing Hellfire missiles, this equates to nine reloads for 
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the configurations including the MH-60R and four reloads for the configurations 
including the AH-1Z. These quantities were considered when determining the initial 
outfitting costs of ammunition for the APKWS and Hellfire missiles to be stored aboard 
the LCS, separate from the one full load-out initially outfitted on each aerial asset. The 
APKWS magazine contains six rockets on a MQ-8B platform, 38 rockets on a MH-60R 
platform, and 76 rockets on an AH-1Z platform; while the Hellfire magazine contain 
eight missiles on a MH-60R platform and 16 missiles on an AH-1Z platform. For 
example, an AH-1Z equipped with APKWS will cost $33.73M for each aerial asset 
purchased plus $2.17M for the initial outfitting of one full load-out of weapons per asset, 
totaling $35.90M per asset (U.S. Army 2013). The LCS will also store three magazines 
containing 76 APKWS rockets that will cost $6.51M to initially outfit the LCS, 
independent of the quantity of aerial assets within a configuration (U.S. Navy 2014f). 
As defined by the LAMP physical solutions, a LCS is capable of carrying 1 
magazine for the ammunitions used by the MK 75 76 mm gun, which has a capacity of 
800 rounds; LCS is capable of carrying 2 magazines for the GMLRS, which contains six 
missiles per magazine.  
A peacetime cost estimate must also include the procurement of war reserves, 
which are designed to cover the period at the beginning of a war before the economy and 
military procurements are able to replace the materiel consumed during the war (Surmeir 
1969). Based upon the expected use of the LAMP captured in the DRM, the maximum 
wartime reserve per LAMP would be two full load outs of the magazines. These costs are 
included in the table below, in the ammunition initial outfitting costs for shipboard 
weapon systems, and in the LCS initial outfitting costs at the bottom of the table for air 
assets. 
The procurement and installment costs per unit for each of the systems can be 
found in Table 20 and are reported in FY14 dollars. These costs are listed per air asset or 
weapon system, and including initial ammunition loadouts as well as war reserves. 
LAMP configurations containing more than one air asset would experience lower per-
asset costs due to the LCS magazine size remaining the same regardless of the number of 
air assets employed. 
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 System Procurement Costs (after Oestergaard 2014a, U.S. Table 20
Army 2013, U.S. Navy 2014f, U.S. Navy 2014g, U.S. Navy 
2014h, and U.S. Navy 2011b) 
 
System Total Procurement Cost 
MK 75 76 mm Gun $11,480,233 
GMLRS w/ M-30 $8,053,800 
MQ-8B w/ APKWS $56,753,300 
MH-60R w/ Hellfire $59,985,200 
MH-60R w/ APKWS $57,697,540 
AH-1Z w/ Hellfire $55,008,400 
AH-1Z w/ APKWS $55,443,200 
 
3. Operation and Support 
a. Manpower 
 The manpower cost estimate includes the costs associated with the required labor 
for military personnel to operate the system. Manpower was considered extra manpower 
required to operate the aerial assets and shipboard weapon systems; this analysis assumes 
that the missiles and rockets associated with a given LAMP configuration do not require 
additional manpower requirements beyond what is captured in the maintenance and 
training costs. Labor costs associated with the maintenance and training of the system are 
covered in the sections below, since the information was obtained from separate sources. 
To calculate the manpower cost estimates, the personnel requirements were collected 
from military sites identifying the operator requirements. Composite yearly salaries were 
used to determine the manpower costs to operate the system based on the personnel 
required to operate the systems. These salaries were obtained from the Department of the 
Navy section of the FY 2014 DOD Military Personnel Composite Standard Pay and 
Reimbursement Rates. The annual DOD composite rate was used for personnel costs--
this rate includes average basic pay plus accrual, Medicare-eligible retiree health care 
accrual, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, incentive and 
special pay, permanent change of station expenses and miscellaneous pay (U.S. DOD 
2013). Table 21 shows the quantity of military personnel and yearly salaries of the 
personnel required to operate each of the systems. 
 95 
 Operations Manpower Estimates (after U.S. DOD 2013) Table 21
 
System Required Personnel Yearly Cost Life Cycle Personnel 
Cost (25 Years) 
76 mm Gun 1 E-4, 4 E-2 $257,492 $6,437,300 
GMLRS 1 E-4, 1 E-5, 1 E-6 $248,236 $6,205,900 
MQ-8B 2 O-2 $237,436 $5,935,900 
MH-60R 2 O-2 $237,436 $5,935,900 
AH-1Z 2 O-2 $237,436 $5,935,900 
 
For this analysis, it has been assumed that the manpower cost estimate also 
considers training costs of the operator. It has been assumed that, based on the required 
personnel rank and rating or military occupational specialty, the operators are considered 
trained to operate the systems; therefore separate training costs have not been considered 
by this analysis. 
b. Maintenance 
 Maintenance occurs at the Organizational, Intermediate, and Depot levels. It is an 
important factor in the LCC of each of the systems. These values were obtained through 
the Navy visibility and management of operating and support costs (VAMOSC) for the 
Navy related items, as well as the Army Operating and Support Management Information 
System (OSMIS) for Army related items. The Navy and Army track the LCC areas of 
their systems and report them in VAMOSC and OSMIS, in order to be used to analyze 
different systems. Labor costs were collected for the most recent five years’ worth of 
maintenance for each of the assets associated with the potential solutions. Maintenance 
can vary from year to year, so the average was used to ensure that the estimates were not 
inflated or underestimated due to a year with abnormally high or low maintenance 
requirements. These values were divided by the quantity of systems for each year to 
determine the average maintenance costs for each system, and then averaged to determine 
the average yearly maintenance costs for each system. The cost estimate assumed that 
missiles themselves do not require any maintenance—they are either successfully fired or 
disposed of as unusable. The estimate also assumed that the missiles do not have a 
limited service life that requires them to be periodically assessed or serviced. 
 96 
 To account for the difference in helicopter flight hours per year, the helicopter 
values were broken down into maintenance costs per hour of flight time, then considered 
for 200 flight hours per asset. These 200 flight hours account for required exercises that 
occur throughout the year. For example, the AH-1Z averages 131 flight hours per year, 
while the MH-60R averages 346 flight hours per year (U.S. Navy 2014d). This likely 
causes more maintenance to be performed on the MH-60R than on the AH-1Z. By using 
the ratio of flight hours for 200 hours, the values are compared more fairly, since the 
missions for each helicopter will be the same for LAMP. Table 22 displays the average 
yearly maintenance costs. 
 Maintenance Costs (after U.S. Army 2014b; U.S. Navy Table 22
2014d) 
 
System Average Yearly 
Maintenance Cost 
Life Cycle Maintenance 
Cost (25 Years) 
76 mm Gun $28,444 $711,106 
GMLRS $67,880 $1,696,960 
MQ-8B $175,000 $4,375,000 
MH-60R $982,300 $24,557,494 
AH-1Z $1,118,195 $27,954,886 
 
c. Training 
 As discussed in the manpower section, it is assumed that operators have already 
been trained to operate and maintain the systems. For purposes of this evaluation, it has 
been assumed that costs to cross-train personnel to maintain the systems are similar in 
costs; therefore, it will not provide additional cost difference in a system, and has not 
been considered in the cost estimation. 
d. Spares 
 The costs of spares for each asset are reported separately from the maintenance 
costs which reports only the costs of labor to perform period scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance. These values are reported in VAMOSC and OSMIS. Therefore, these costs 
were obtained from these two sources. The same method was used to gather spares cost 
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as was used for the maintenance costs. Cost were obtained over five years, and then 
averaged for the quantity of systems. In the case of the helicopters, these values were 
determined by flight hours, and normalized over 200 flight hours per asset. These values 
are displayed in Table 23. 
 Spares Costs (after U.S. Army 2014b and U.S. Navy Table 23
2014d) 
 
System Average Yearly Spares Cost Life Cycle Spares Cost (25 Years) 
76 mm Gun $77,290 $1,932,250 
GMLRS $32,957 $823,920 
MQ-8B $222,620 $5,565,530 
MH-60R $17,620 $440,499 
AH-1Z $30,054 $751,338 
 
e. Ammunition 
The LCCE must also include ammunition expenditure for each asset. Even when 
not in wartime use, there will be live fire demonstrations, training exercises, and test 
events to verify full system functionality after new installations or major system repairs. 
For purposes of this evaluation, it has been assumed that 200 rounds of gun ammunition, 
and 20 missiles per air or shipboard weapon system are expended per year.  
Costs per round were obtained from Navy and Army budget documents. The 
initial magazine costs for outfitting the LCS magazines and procuring war reserves were 
calculated based on these costs per round. This cost is dependent only upon the munition 
type; the initial ammunition outfitting of each air asset is included in its procurement 
cost. Yearly costs were then calculated, based upon the cost per round and the expected 
peacetime expenditure rate, with total costs over the 25-year life span of an LCS 




 Ammunition Costs (after U.S. Army 2013; U.S. Navy Table 24
2014g; U.S. Navy 2014h) 
 
System Yearly Cost Total Cost (25 
Years) 
MK 75 76 mm Gun $229,600 $5,740,000 
GMLRS with M30 $2,541,000 $63,525,000 
MQ-8B with APKWS $571,400 $14,285,000 
MH-60R with Hellfire $2,046,000 $51,150,000 
MH-60R with APKWS $571,400 $14,285,000 
AH-1Z with Hellfire $2,046,000 $51,150,000 
AH-1Z with APKWS $571,400 $14,285,000 
 
f. Fuel 
 Each aerial asset, while deployed, includes fuel costs required to operate. The data 
for yearly fuel costs for AH-1Z and MH-60R were pulled from VAMOSC, which reports 
total yearly fuel costs. This data was divided by the total flight hours flown by the 
systems deployed and then multiplied by the assumed 200 flight hours flown per asset per 
year.   
Fuel cost data was not available for the MQ-8B or other analogous unmanned 
aerial vehicles. Therefore, the cost was determined based on a ratio compared to the AH-
1Z. Due to the difference in size, weight and speed, the MQ-8B, with the same amount of 
flight time, is assumed to use one-fifth of the fuel as the AH-1Z. This assumption is based 
on the fact that the MQ-8B is half the size, one-sixth of the weight, and cruises at two-
thirds of the speed of the AH-1Z (Oestergaard 2014b and Oestergaard 2014c). The 







 Fuel Costs (after U.S. Navy 2014d) Table 25
 
System Average Yearly Fuel Cost LCC Fuel Cost (25 Years) 
MQ-8B $19,965   $499,140 
MH-60R $102,788 $2,569,690 
AH-1Z $99,828 $2,495,704 
 
4. Overall System Cost Estimation 
 The analysis of the cost is based on the LCCE for each alternative. The key 
drivers impacting the overall cost are analyzed by life-cycle phase. The total costs for 
each potential LAMP asset are presented in Table 26; the LAMP configurations and their 
associated LCCEs are shown in Table 27. The asset costs include the R&D, procurement, 
and O&S costs discussed above (including initial ammunition loadout and wartime 
reserve costs).   
 Asset LCCE Comparison Table 26
 
System R&D Procurement O&S Total 
MK 75 76 mm Gun $6,636,000 $11,480,233 $14,820,658 $32,896,891  
GMLRS & M-30 Rocket $6,636,000 $8,053,800 $71,911,125 $86,600,925 
MQ-8B w/ APKWS $0 $56,753,300 $30,660,572 $87,413,872 
MH-60R w/ Hellfire $0 $59,985,200 $84,653,584 $144,638,784 
MH-60R w/ APKWS $0 $57,697,540 $47,788,584 $105,486,124 
AH-1Z w/ Hellfire $0 $55,008,400 $88,287,878 $143,296,228 














 LAMP Configuration LCCEs Table 27
LAMP 
Configuration 
Air Detachment Shipboard 
Weapon System 
Total Cost 
0 None None $0  
1 None 76 mm Gun $32,936,891  
2 None GMLRS $86,600,925  
3 (1) MQ-8B w/APKWS None $87,413,872  
4 (1) MQ-8B w/APKWS 76 mm Gun $120,350,763  
5 (1) MQ-8B w/APKWS GMLRS $174,014,797  
6 (1) MH-60 w/Hellfire None $144,638,784  
7 (1) MH-60 w/Hellfire 76 mm Gun $177,575,675  
8 (1) MH-60 w/Hellfire GMLRS $231,239,709  
9 (1) MH-60 w/APKWS None $105,486,124  
10 (1) MH-60 w/APKWS 76 mm Gun $138,423,015  
11 (1) MH-60 w/APKWS GMLRS $192,087,049  
12 (1) AH-1Z w/Hellfire None $143,296,228  
13 (1) AH-1Z w/Hellfire 76 mm Gun $176,233,119  
14 (1) AH-1Z w/Hellfire GMLRS $229,897,153  
15 (1) AH-1Z w/APKWS None $106,866,028  
16 (1) AH-1Z w/APKWS 76 mm Gun $139,802,919  
17 (1) AH-1Z w/APKWS GMLRS $193,466,953  
18 (2) MQ-8B w/APKWS None $155,285,864  
19 (2) MQ-8B w/APKWS 76 mm Gun $188,222,755  
20 (2) MQ-8B w/APKWS GMLRS $241,886,789  
21 (2) MH-60 w/Hellfire None $267,180,767  
22 (2) MH-60 w/Hellfire 76 mm Gun $300,117,658  
23 (2) MH-60 w/Hellfire GMLRS $353,781,692  
24 (2) MH-60 w/APKWS None $191,430,367  
25 (2) MH-60 w/APKWS 76 mm Gun $224,367,258  
26 (2) MH-60 w/APKWS GMLRS $278,031,292  
27 (2) AH-1Z w/Hellfire None $266,950,856  
28 (2) AH-1Z w/Hellfire 76 mm Gun $299,887,747  
29 (2) AH-1Z w/Hellfire GMLRS $353,551,781  
30 (2) AH-1Z w/APKWS None $194,190,176  
31 (2) AH-1Z w/APKWS 76 mm Gun $227,127,067  
32 (2) AH-1Z w/APKWS GMLRS $280,791,101  
33 (3) MQ-8B w/APKWS None $223,157,856  
34 (3) MQ-8B w/APKWS 76 mm Gun $256,094,747  
35 (3) MQ-8B w/APKWS GMLRS $309,758,781  
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V. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
With models established and cost estimation data collected, the project focused on 
answering the remaining research questions: can LCS provide (cost-)effective joint fire 
support?  This question was first considered by collecting simulation data from the 
discrete-event model described in Chapter IV in order to identify the most effective 
LAMP configuration(s). With mission effectiveness established, the project included 
consideration of cost data (also discussed in Chapter IV) in order to identify the most 
cost-effective LAMP configuration(s). This chapter presents the results of these 
considerations in order to identify the LAMP configuration(s) most effective at providing 
fires employment and ISR&T data collection in support of amphibious operations. 
With three MOEs selected for this study and with certain criteria required by the 
various capabilities documents, the first down select of configuration alternatives was 
based on the need for sufficing the LAMP configuration against the operational 
requirements listed in the various capabilities documents. This approach, described by 
Blanchard and Fabrycky, is referred to as comparing alternatives against a standard. For 
this project, the down-select rule used in support of comparing alternatives against 
standard was based on the threshold values of the appropriate operational requirements, 
since any achievable objective requirement was considered to be in the acquisition 
manager’s trade space.   
The rule used for this was that a LAMP configuration could only be retained if it 
meets all the operational requirement standards to at least the threshold value for easily 
determined requirements for: weapon system sustained rate of fire, weapon system range, 
and for ISR&T range. This approach excluded LAMP configurations 0, 1, and 2 from 
further consideration due to the lack of the necessary ISR&T range, a result of not having 
air detachments associated with these configurations. 
Comparing alternatives against a standard could not be employed for the 
operational requirements that generated the MOEs for probability of targets detected, 
time for engagement and probability of targets affected.   Since these MOEs required 
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modeling and simulation, another method beyond comparing alternatives against a 
standard was required.  
This project evaluated each LAMP configuration in terms of a given 
configuration’s overall measure of effectiveness (OMOE). A configuration’s OMOE was 
calculated by converting the configuration’s MOE mean values to utility scores, 
multiplying each of those utility scores by a swing weight (equal swing weights were 
used for each utility score associated with a given configuration), and summing those 
values. This approach resulted in OMOE values that range between zero and one, with 
zero being the worst and one indicating a perfectly effective configuration. 
Two of the three MOEs were evaluated as a percentage (i.e., MOEs 1 and 3), 
precluding the need to convert those values to utility scores; the mean of the measured 
values was used as the utility score. Engagement time (MOE 2), however, required the 
development of a utility curve to convert time into a percentage that could be weighted 
and then added to the other two MOEs. From the ICD for Joint Fires, ten minutes was the 
stated maximum acceptable time. For this evaluation, an engagement time of one minute 
or less was assigned a perfect score of 1.0, while ten minutes or greater was assigned a 
score of 0.0; a linear function was used to characterize the utility curve between an 
engagement time of one and ten minutes.   Figure 39 is a plot of the utility curve used to 
convert engagement time to a utility score.  
 104 
 
Figure 39 MOE 2 Utility Curve 
With each MOE expressed as a percentage, a weighted method of evaluation was 
employed to calculate an overall MOE score for each data point collected during 
simulation. Since it was not possible to gain consensus across a broad range of 
stakeholders, the weighting factors of each MOE were rated equally and were each 
multiplied by a factor of 0.33 (with all three weighting factors summing up to one). 
By calculating an OMOE for each simulation data point, the project was able to 
identify statistically significant differences between the OMOE scores of multiple LAMP 
configurations. Figure 40 presents a stack chart of the OMOE scores of the various 
LAMP configurations; Table 28 provides the top five most effective LAMP 




















Engagement Time (minutes) 
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Figure 40 LAMP Configurations’ OMOE Comparison 
 Top Five Most Effective Feasible LAMP Configurations in Table 28






Weapon Air Detachment OMOE (95% CI) Rank 
8 GMLRS (1) MH-60 w/Hellfire 0.80 ± 0.01 1st 
19 76mm (2) MQ-8B w/APKWS 0.78 ± 0.01 2nd 
11 GMLRS (1) MH-60 w/APKWS 0.77 ± 0.01 2nd 
20 GMLRS (2) MQ-8B w/APKWS 0.77 ± 0.01 2nd 
7 76mm (1) MH-60 w/Hellfire 0.77 ± 0.01 2nd 
 
 
The ability of the LAMP to deploy two manned air assets significantly impacts 
the overall effectiveness of the LAMP providing fire support and ISR&T data collection.   

































Hellfire missiles and either shipboard weapon system would have an overall effectiveness 
of 0.85-0.87. 
With OMOE scores calculated and the LCCEs for each configuration established, 
as discussed previously, the project plotted LCCEs against configuration OMOE scores. 
The resultant chart, provided as Figure 41, allowed for the identification of “dominated” 
solutions, i.e., solutions that are not as effective as cheaper alternatives. Alternatively, 
“non-dominated” solutions were also identified in order to reduce the trade-space of 
potential solutions. In Figure 41, the non-dominated solutions are shown as blue 
diamonds, while the dominated solutions are presented as red squares; infeasible 
solutions (i.e., solutions with two manned air assets) are presented as green triangles. 
 























There are a total of six LAMP configurations that are non-dominated solutions; 
the data associated with these configurations is provided in Table 29.   




Results of the analysis indicate that a cost-effective LAMP does not consist of an 
AH-1Z helicopter, regardless of weapon load-out, nor do any of the cost-effective LAMP 
configurations consist of a GMLRS; all of the other shipboard weapon system 
configurations (none or the 76 mm gun) and air assets (MQ-8B w/APKWS, MH-60R w/
Hellfire, and MH-60R w/APKWS) appear in one or more of the non-dominated 
alternatives. The least effective non-dominated solution, a single MQ-8B with no 
shipboard weapon system, provides significantly less effectiveness than the next-
expensive alternative (a single MH-60R equipped with APKWS rockets with no 
shipboard weapon system). These two lowest-cost alternatives make sense—the smallest 
barrier to entry for the LCS to support amphibious operations is the deployment of an air 
asset to collect ISR&T data and employ fires. 
Two of the non-dominated solutions provide questionable value (i.e., 
effectiveness) for a particular LCCE. For example: Alternative 3 provides an 
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effectiveness of just 0.3 at a cost of $87.4M; for an additional ~$20M, the LAMP would 
be anticipated to achieve LAMP effectiveness of 0.67—almost a 100% increase in 
effectiveness for only a ~20% increase in LCC. This drastic difference between 
Alternatives 3 and 9 is used as justification for eliminating Alternative 3 from final 
recommendations. Further, Alternative 19 provides very little benefit over Alternative 7, 
but is estimated to cost over $10M more over the expected life-cycle. For this reason, 
Alternative 19 has been eliminated from inclusion in the final recommendation. 
Elimination of Alternatives 3 and 19 from the final group of recommended 
solutions resulted in the identification of five alternatives (9, 4, 10, and 7) that may, 
overall, provide cost-effective joint fire support. Each of the four alternatives had an 
equivalent MOE 1 value of 70%. MOE 2 provides a point of distinction between the five 
alternatives, as does MOE 3. Alternatives 4 and 7 provide a relatively low average 
engagement time of less than three minutes, while the least expensive alternative only 
provides an average engagement time of ~6.5 minutes. Alternatively, the cheapest of the 
four solutions (Alternative 9) provides one of the highest estimated percentage of threats 
successfully affected, and does so with an average engagement time that meets the 
objective MOE 2 value by a healthy margin (30%). A final recommendation may be 
supported by greater insight to any potential differences between the swing weights 
associated with each of the MOEs considered by this project. 
There are four infeasible solutions (i.e., solutions with two manned air assets) that 
are non-dominated: Alternatives 25, 26, 22, and 23. All four of these alternatives utilize 
two MH-60R air assets; the four alternatives provide different combinations of the 76 
mm or GMLRS shipboard weapon system and Hellfire or APKWS air weapons. The 
configuration utilizing APKWS rockets and a 76 mm gun is estimated to cost ~$75M less 
than the configuration utilizing Hellfire missiles for a relatively equivalent level of 
effectiveness (in terms of all MOEs and OMOE). The alternatives utilizing GMLRS 
appear to be more effective than the configurations utilizing the 76 mm gun, all other 
parameters equal. 
This analysis indicates that the additional cost of a second manned air asset does 
not provide a significant increase in specific nor overall effectiveness, since configuration 
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19 has an OMOE of 0.78 but with a LCCE over $35M less than the least-expensive two-
manned-aircraft non-dominated alternative (with a LCCE of ~$225M and an OMOE of 
0.81.   
This analysis also provides some insight to the effectiveness of three unmanned 
aircraft versus two manned aircraft. With three unmanned aviation assets, Alternatives 
33, 34 and 35 offer a glimpse of unmanned ISR&T coupled with a shooter, while 
configuration 34 (72mm gun with three MQ-8Bs with APKWS) has the highest OMOE 
(.74) at a LCCE just over $250M. However, this configuration is dominated by 
alternatives utilizing two manned air assets—as are the other alternatives utilizing three 




This project considered whether or not a LAMP could perform ISR&T data 
collection and fires employment in support of amphibious operations. These missions 
were selected through an analysis of capability gaps documented in ICDs and the POM-
16 MCGL. The LCS platform was considered due to its flexibility in deploying systems 
focused on a particular mission as part of a MP. As part of this consideration, the 
following research questions were addressed:  
• What threats exist for an ARG/MEU during amphibious operations? 
• What alternatives exist for providing joint fires capability with a LCS MP? 
• Could LCS provide effective joint fire support? 
• What would the most cost-effective LCS mission package be to support 
amphibious operations? 
In order to address the questions listed above, this project defined and executed a 
tailored SE process that included problem space analysis, identification of alternatives, 
modeling and simulation, and an analysis of alternatives. Each phase focused on 
answering a different research question. 
A. WHAT THREATS EXIST FOR AN ARG/MEU DURING AMPHIBIOUS 
OPERATIONS? 
Problem space analysis included the identification of threats to the ARG/MEU 
during amphibious operations. As discussed in the DRM in Chapter II, threats to the 
ARG/MEU during amphibious operations included armored and unarmored, fixed and 
mobile targets. The representative threat for this project was a mechanized infantry 
brigade, consisting of ten battalions of a range of threats. The force level of the threat was 
estimated at 5,000 units. 
The DRM provided additional details regarding the expected operational 
environment of the LAMP, including environmental and geographic conditions. These 
characteristics of the operating environment were used to derive operational requirements 
that the LAMP would be expected to meet in providing ISR&T data collection and fires 
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employment in support of amphibious operations. These operational requirements were 
presented at the end of Chapter II. 
B. WHAT ALTERNATIVES EXIST FOR PROVIDING JOINT FIRES 
CAPABILITY WITH A LCS MP? 
With the operational requirements established, this project transitioned to the 
identification of alternatives for providing joint fires capability with a LCS MP. 
Alternative identification was based on the operational activities originally identified 
during DRM development which were, in turn, tied to capability areas related to the 
originally identified capability gaps of ISR&T data collection and fires employment. 
Operational activities were allocated to the LAMP and further described in terms of the 
external activities that the LAMP would be expected to interface with. This process, 
presented in Chapter III, resulted in definition of the LAMP operational architecture. 
The LAMP operational architecture, in turn, was used to develop the LAMP 
functional and physical architectures in order to specifically answer the question of what 
alternatives exist for providing joint fires capability with a LCS MP. The results of this 
functional analysis and allocation, described in Chapter III, include a physical 
architecture that consists of four elements: a shipboard weapon system, an air 
detachment, a C2 system, and a logistics support system. The allocation of LAMP 
functions to each of these elements was used to derive functional requirements for each 
of the elements and to identify existing systems that would meet those requirements. 
In turn, systems currently deployed by the DOD were evaluated to identify those 
systems that meet the requirements allocated to the shipboard weapon system and air 
assets that make up the LAMP air detachment. Those systems identified for consideration 
as potential shipboard weapon systems include: 
• 76 mm gun 
• GMLRS 
Those systems identified for consideration as potential air assets include: 
• MQ-8B Firescout with APKWS rockets 
• MH-60R Seahawk with Hellfire missiles 
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• MH-60R Seahawk with APKWS rockets 
• AH-1Z Viper with Hellfire missiles 
• AH-1Z Viper with APKWS rockets 
C. COULD LCS PROVIDE EFFECTIVE JOINT FIRE SUPPORT? 
As part of LAMP alternative identification, the feasible configurations of these 
shipboard weapon systems and air assets were defined by considering the requirements 
associated with a LCS MP as well as other limitations associated with the logistics 
support of a LAMP configuration. These considerations resulted in the identification of 
36 potential LAMP configurations that would provide joint fires in support of amphibious 
operations, as described in Chapter IV, Section A. 
The next research question that this project focused on was whether or not any of 
the identified configurations would provide effective fire support for amphibious 
operations. This question was scoped in terms of three MOEs, which were derived from 
the DRM and operational requirements. The three LAMP MOEs evaluated by this project 
were 
• MOE 1:  Percent of targets identified in 4 hours   
• MOE 2:  Time between system receipt of fire mission and target impact  
• MOE 3:  Percentage of targets successfully affected  
In order to evaluate the various alternatives’ in terms of the identified MOEs, this 
project developed BOE and discrete-event models for both the ISR&T data collection and 
fires employment phases of the amphibious raid described in the DRM. The developed 
models used the factors associated with each configuration (i.e., the air assets and 
shipboard weapon system associated with each configuration) as input, translated those 
factors into specific system parameters based on the constituent asset parameters (e.g., 
shipboard weapon system rate of fire, air asset platform speed), and evaluated the given 
configurations to determine the effectiveness of each in terms of the defined MOEs. The 
models used to evaluate the effectiveness of each feasible configuration are presented in 
Chapter IV. 
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D. WHAT WOULD THE MOST COST-EFFECTIVE LCS MISSION 
PACKAGE BE TO SUPPORT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS? 
Based upon the potential alternatives’ mission effectiveness and associated cost 
estimates, the analysis of alternatives evaluated which configuration was the most cost-
effective solution. Four feasible alternatives were ultimately identified as cost-effective 
solutions, ranging between LCCEs of $105.49M and $188.22M and providing varying 
levels of effectiveness in terms of average engagement time and percentage of threats 
successfully affected. These include Alternative 9 (MH-60 w/APKWS and no shipboard 
weapon), Alternative 4 (MQ-8B w/APKWS and a 76 mm gun), Alternative 10 (one MH-
60R w/APKWS and a 76 mm gun), and Alternative 7 (MH-60 w/Hellfire and a 76 mm 
gun). 
E. FUTURE WORK 
While this paper considered the effectiveness of LAMP configurations in two 
distinct phases of an amphibious assault, a unified model that considered the relationship 
between the data collection and fires employment models may better characterize the 
effectiveness of a LAMP in AMW. A more unified approach to modeling the multiple 
phases of an amphibious assault may support further analysis of the necessary interfaces 
between the LAMP elements, and the effectiveness of the LCS seaframe in providing and 
supporting those interfaces. 
This analysis assumed a LAMP crew of fourteen dedicated to the system 
elements; further work may consider the C2 functions that may be assumed by additional 
LAMP operations, related to both the LAMP assets and various actors within the ARG/
MEU. This further work would benefit from the analysis of the LAMP element interfaces 
mentioned above, and may contribute to the consideration of capability gaps not 
presented in this report. 
An analysis of the technical integration of a GMLRS or 76 mm gun with a LCS 
mission module may provide further insight to the technical risk associated with the 
evaluated LAMP configurations. The technical risk of each configuration may be 
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considered against the presented OMOEs and LCCEs for further characterization of the 
risk/reward associated with each configuration. 
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APPENDIX A – USMC CAPABILITY GAP ANALYSIS 
This appendix provides the list of capability gaps considered by this project in 
support of DRM and operational architecture development. Table 30 provides a complete 
list of the fire support and ISR&T capability gaps considered by this project. 
 Considered Capability Gaps (after USMC 2014a; U.S. Table 30






GAP TITLE GAP DESCRIPTION 
6 POM-16 MCGL  
Engage direct fire targets 
during amphibious/mech 
ops 
(U) The Assault Amphibian Community lacks the ability to 
effectively engage targets in all environments through organic 
direct-fire means. 
8 POM-16 MCGL  
Engage targets with 
appropriate weapons/
target pairing 
(U) As a results of the DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and 
Unintended Harm to Civilians dated 19 June 2008, the GCE will 
lose its use of the 155mm Dual Purpose Improved Conventional 
Munitions (DPICM) projectiles. DPICM is the most effective 
155mm munition in the GCE inventory against light, medium, 
and heavy targets and it is particularly effective against widely 
dispersed, inaccurately located targets. 
33 POM-16 MCGL  
Weapons/equipment 
signatures 
(U) The Marine Corps has a limited ability to avoid detection of 
maneuver units due to individual small arms/equipment 
signatures as a result of equipment weight, bulk, and design; 
small arms/equipment signatures across the visible/IR spectrum 
(current gap is against SWIR); and weapons audible/visual 
signatures when the weapon is fired. 
38 POM-16 MCGL  
Conduct Distribution 
Operations 
(U) Limited distribution capability to efficiently and effectively 
deliver tailored and responsive force packages and functional 
logistics capabilities (to include communications, engineer, 
transportation, and ordnance equipment) to MAGTF elements 
that are widely dispersed in developed and undeveloped areas 
with limited road access. This gap includes material handling 
services for medium capacity lifting to include clearing landing 
zones of supplies and equipment, loading and unloading combat 
vehicles, aircraft, and ISO containers. This gap includes the 
inability to manage/perform proper freight distribution while in a 
deployed environment to supported units/organizations. This gap 
also includes the inability to adequately distribute large amounts 
of potable water to locations away from production point. 
39 POM-16 MCGL  
VMU Precision Fires 
Capability 
(U) The VMU squadrons lack the ability to precisely engage 
fixed, stationary, and moving surface targets via kinetic means, 
which adversely limits the MAGTF’s ability to rapidly prosecute 
fleeting and/or highly-defended targets during MAGTF activities 
across the range of military operations. 
88 POM-16 MCGL  
Stop vehicles, small 
vessels, or aircraft (on 
the ground) through non-
lethal means 
(U) Limited ability to stop vehicles. No capability to stop small 
vessels and A/C (On the Ground) while minimizing casualties 
and limiting collateral damage. 






GAP TITLE GAP DESCRIPTION 
93 POM-16 MCGL  
limited ability to disable 
vehicles vessels, or A/C 
(on the ground) through 
non-lethal means 
(U) Limited ability to disable vehicles and A/C (On the Ground) 
while Minimizing casualties and limiting collateral damage. 
99 POM-16 MCGL  
Deficient capability to 
adequately provide SFA/
FID forces 
(U) The Marine Corps’ ability to provide adequate forces to 
conduct SFA/FID missions in permissive and uncertain 





Ability to transmit and 
receive the required 
targeting information 
from ISR&T sources to 
fires command and 
control systems. 
The critical task description is the capability to assign target-
weapon pairing, provide target locations, target descriptions, and 
specify methods of fire. This capability requires a well-defined 
joint fires C2 organization, and supporting systems architecture. 
Within this architecture, ISR&T systems must provide accurate, 
precise target locations in a responsive manner and should strive 
to reduce the kill chain timeline through more efficient 
exploitation and measurement processes. From a joint targeting 
perspective, the various Service ISR&T programs that contribute 
to the Target element of the F2T2EA kill chain must be fully 
interoperable, interdependent and designed to seamlessly 
interface with the fires command and control systems – this also 
requires networked and knowledge empowered expeditionary 
joint forces. The desired capability includes a target nomination 
and sensor/weapon pairing to target process that provides clarity 
regarding the priority of, and desired effects, associated with a 
particular target that results in the issuance of a timely, efficient 
and unambiguous engagement order. This includes highly 
integrated and automated planning systems and processes, asset 
deconfliction and final target location data in a format usable by 
the shooter. Finally, this desired capability includes the capability 
to conduct counter-battery detection with in-service and future 
airborne, shipboard and ground-based radar systems. Achieving 
this desired capability as soon as practicable will enable the 
Commander to exploit other Service ISR&T capabilities which 
will significantly improve the responsiveness in passing effective 





Ability to engage moving 
point and moving area 
targets under restricted 
weather conditions. 
Conduct Joint Fire Support to achieve desired effects against 
moving point and moving area targets in restricted weather 
conditions; for example, when the sensor providing the target 
location to the weapon is unable to “see” the target due to poor 
weather conditions such as fog, low ceiling, haze, heavy rain, or 
blowing sand. Achieving a continuous adverse-weather/terrain 
fires capability as soon as practicable will enable the Commander 
to provide effective, agile and persistent fires to attack targets in 





Ability to engage known 
and / or identified targets 
when friendly forces are 
in close contact or when 
collateral damage is a 
concern. 
Conduct joint fire support when the rules of engagement impose 
limitations on collateral damage or casualties. This desired 
capability requires precision, improved accuracy and scalable or 
reduced blast radius (or effects) engagement capabilities. 
Achieving this desired capability as soon as practicable will assist 
the Army, Marine Corps and Special Operations Forces 
Component Commander to maneuver and control territory, 
populations and fix key enemy formations in order to remove 







GAP TITLE GAP DESCRIPTION 
N/A JOINT FIRES ICD 
Ability to provide 
fires to achieve 
volume effects (i.e., 
suppression) 
Joint fire support capability that is agile, flexible and capable of 
providing sustained amounts of fire power to support Army, 
Marine Corps and Special Operations Force mobile maneuver 
forces. The fire support capability must have sufficient capacity 
to deliver a large volume of fires on multiple targets 
simultaneously or over a short period of time, as well as the 
capability to deliver a high density of accurate fires in a 
concentrated area to rapidly achieve the desired effects. 
20 POM-16 MCGL  
Electronic Warfare 
Support 
(U//FOUO)  The ability to sense the Electromagnetic Operating 
Environment to provide strategic and tactical Electronic Warfare 
support information to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
commander for the purpose of coordinating Spectrum maneuver 
with command and control. 
25 POM-16 MCGL  
Direct integrated fire 
control engagements 
(U) Addresses the Marine Corps air and ground sensors, 
networks, platforms, command and control (C2) and weapon 
systems ability to support Integrated Fire Control (IFC) 
engagements of enemy air threats including Precision Cue, 
Engagements on Remote, Engage on Composite and Forward 
Pass. 
43 POM-16 MCGL  
Persistent Ground 
Surveillance 
(U) MAGTF has limited ability to conduct persistent ground 
surveillance in AOR during offensive and defensive operations 
both day and night. 
46 POM-16 MCGL  IAMD Detect Threats 
(U) Addresses MAGTF ability to classify or determine the type 
or model of non-cooperative aircraft and detect, identify, and 
track low altitude threats and non-line-of-sight targets. 
78 POM-16 MCGL  
Intelligence 
Collection 
(U) Limited ability to establish persistent all-source collection 
against targets operating in complex terrain. This includes 
collection against weapons and explosives, including CBRN 







The ability to conduct persistent multi-discipline intelligence 
collection, near-real-time reallocation, and dynamic re-tasking of 
assets. This gap is an issue of both sufficiency (insufficient 
number of intelligence collection assets) and a lack of capability 







Provide automated information dissemination and enhanced data 








Enhance commanders’ situational awareness by providing near-
real-time relevant information within a collaborative C2 
environment based on federated data standards and schema, an 





Increase ISR range 
and persistence 
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APPENDIX B – LAMP CV-6 
This appendix (Table 31) provides the matrix that documents the traceability 
between the capabilities assigned to the LAMP as part of the DRM and the operational 
activities associated with those capabilities. 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































OA.0 Provide AMW Mission Support X X X
OA.1 Deploy/Conduct Maneuver X X
Conduct Strike/Power Projection Warfare




OA.2 Develop Intelligence X X X
Assess Tactical Environment
Collect Target Information
Establish Secure and Rapid Dissemination Means
Disseminate and Integrate Intelligence
Perform Tactical Recon and Surveillance
Collect Data And Intelligence
OA.3 Conduct Fire Support X X X X
Illumminate/Designate Targets
Interdict Enemy Operational Forces/Targets
Select Target to Attack
Engage Targets
Attack Surface Targets
Attack Enemy Land Targets
Select Platforms and Systems for Attack X
Adjust Fires X
Integrate Tactical Fires




OA.5 Exercise Command and Control X X X
Manage Means of Communicating Information
Receive and Transmit Force Orders
Analyze and Assess Situation
Acquire, Process, Communicate Information, and 
Maintain Status
Direct, Lead, and Coordinate Forces
BATTLESPACE AWARENESS X




ENGAGEMENT X X X X X X
COMMAND AND CONTROL X X
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APPENDIX C – LAMP SV-5A AND SV-5B 
This appendix (Tables 32, 33, and 34) provides the LAMP SV-5a and SV-5b, 
which documents the traceability between the LAMP operational activities and system 
functions (SV-5a) and system functions to system elements (SV-5b). 
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OA.0 Provide AMW Mission Suppor X
OA.1 Deploy/Conduct Maneuver X
OA.1.1 Conduct Strike/Power Projection Warfare X
OA.1.2 Conduct Tactical Recon and Surveillance X
OA.1.3 Launch Aircraft X
OA.1.4 Recover Aircraft X
OA.1.5 Employ Remote Vehicles X
OA.2 Develop Intelligence X
OA.2.1 Assess Tactical Environment X
OA.2.2 Collect Target Information X
OA.2.3
Establish Secure and Rapid 
Dissemination Means
X
OA.2.4 Disseminate and Integrate Intelligence X
OA.2.5 Perform Tactical Recon and Surveillance X
OA.2.6 Collect Data And Intelligence X
OA.3 Conduct Fire Support X
OA.3.1 Illuminate/Designate Targets X
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OA.3.2 Interdict Enemy Operational Forces/Targets X
OA.3.3 Select Target to Attack X
OA.3.4 Engage Targets X
OA.3.5 Select Platforms and Systems for Attack X
OA.3.6 Adjust Fires X
OA.3.7 Integrate Tactical Fires X
OA.4





OA.4.3 Repair/Maintain Equipment X
OA.5 Exercise Command and Control X
OA.5.1
Manage Means of 
Communicating Information
X
OA.5.2 Receive and Transmit Force Orders X






OA.5.5 Direct, Lead, and Coordinate Forces X
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O.0 LCS AMW MP
O.1 Shipboard Weapon System X
O.1.1 Weapon X X
O.1.2 Dispense System X X
O.2 Air Detachment X
O.2.1 Air Platform X X X X X
O.2.2 Air Weapon System X X
O.2.3 Air ISR System X X X X X X
O.3 C2 Subsystem X X X
O.3.1 Fire Control X X
O.3.2 Communications Distributor X X X X
O.3.3 Air Asset Control X X X X
O.3.4 Data Processor X X X
O.4 Support Subsystem X
O.4.1 Support Distribution System X X X
O.4.2 Status Monitor X
O.4.3
Maintenance and Support 
System X
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APPENDIX D – MODELS 
Figures 42 through 47 provide screen captures of the ExtendSim 8 discrete-event 
models used to evaluate the effectiveness of the various potential LAMP configurations, 
as discussed in Chapter IV.   
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Figure 42 LAMP ISR Discrete-Event Model Snapshot 
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Figure 43 LAMP Shooter Discrete-Event Model Snapshot (part 1 of 5) 
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Figure 47 LAMP Shooter Discrete-Event Model Snapshot (part 5 of 5)
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